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ARTICLES 
ALGORITHMIC JIM CROW 
Margaret Hu* 
 
This Article contends that current immigration- and security-related 
vetting protocols risk promulgating an algorithmically driven form of Jim 
Crow.  Under the “separate but equal” discrimination of a historic Jim Crow 
regime, state laws required mandatory separation and discrimination on the 
front end, while purportedly establishing equality on the back end.  In 
contrast, an Algorithmic Jim Crow regime allows for “equal but separate” 
discrimination.  Under Algorithmic Jim Crow, equal vetting and database 
screening of all citizens and noncitizens will make it appear that fairness and 
equality principles are preserved on the front end.  Algorithmic Jim Crow, 
however, will enable discrimination on the back end in the form of designing, 
interpreting, and acting upon vetting and screening systems in ways that 
result in a disparate impact. 
Currently, security-related vetting protocols often begin with an 
algorithm-anchored technique of biometric identification—for example, the 
collection and database screening of scanned fingerprints and irises, digital 
photographs for facial recognition technology, and DNA.  Immigration 
reform efforts, however, call for the biometric data collection of the entire 
citizenry in the United States to enhance border security efforts and to 
increase the accuracy of the algorithmic screening process.  Newly 
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developed big data vetting tools fuse biometric data with biographic data and 
internet and social media profiling to algorithmically assess risk. 
This Article concludes that those individuals and groups disparately 
impacted by mandatory vetting and screening protocols will largely fall 
within traditional classifications—race, color, ethnicity, national origin, 
gender, and religion.  Disparate-impact consequences may survive judicial 
review if based upon threat risk assessments, terroristic classifications, data-
screening results deemed suspect, and characteristics establishing 
anomalous data and perceived foreignness or dangerousness data—
nonprotected categories that fall outside of the current equal protection 
framework.  Thus, Algorithmic Jim Crow will require an evolution of equality 
law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the 2016 presidential campaign, then-candidate Donald J. Trump 
announced his intention to impose a “Muslim Ban,” which would prohibit 
Muslim entry into the United States1 as part of his counterterrorism strategy.  
 
 1. See, e.g., Jeremy Diamond, Donald Trump:  Ban All Muslim Travel to U.S., CNN 
(Dec. 8, 2015, 4:18 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/donald-trump-muslim-
ban-immigration/ [https://perma.cc/L3D4-UMHX].  Immigration, constitutional, and national 
security experts have offered perspectives on the ongoing legal challenges surrounding the 
Travel Ban.  See generally Margaret Hu, Crimmigration-Counterterrorism and the Travel 
Ban, 2017 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming) (citing Adam Cox, Why a Muslim Ban Is Likely to Be 
Held Unconstitutional:  The Myth of Unconstrained Immigration Power, JUSTSECURITY (Jan. 
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Shortly before his election, Trump also announced a proposal for the 
“extreme vetting” of immigrants and refugees.2  Trump clarified that “[t]he 
Muslim ban is something that in some form has morphed into a[n] extreme 
vetting [protocol] from certain areas of the world.”3 
On January 27, 2017, during his first week as president, Trump signed 
Executive Order 13,769, titled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist 
Entry into the United States” (the “January 27, 2017, Order”).4  Litigation 
concerning the constitutionality of this Executive Order5 focused on sections 
3 and 5(c), provisions that relate to barring the entry of travelers and refugees 
from specific Muslim-majority countries into the United States.6  These 
controversial provisions were challenged as violating equal protection, due 
process, and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, among other 
constitutional and statutory claims.7 
On March 6, 2017, President Trump issued a revised Executive Order (the 
“March 6 2017, Order”), Executive Order 13,780.  Issued under the same title 
as the January 27, 2017, Order, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist 
Entry into the United States,” the March 6, 2017, Order superseded the 
 
30, 2017, 10:21 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/36988/muslim-ban-held-unconstitutional-
myth-unconstrained-immigration-power/ [https://perma.cc/H234-52N2]; then citing Mark 
Tushnet, Mootness and the Travel Ban, BALKINIZATION (June 2, 2017, 1:18 AM) 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/06/mootness-and-travel-ban.html [https://perma.cc/2LNR-
J67T]; then citing Marty Lederman,  Unlocking the Mysteries of the Supreme Court’s Entry 
Ban Case, JUSTSECURITY (June 27, 2017, 8:01 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/ 
42577/mysteries-trump-v-irap/ [https://perma.cc/JAM4-D97M]; and then citing Leah Litman 
& Steve Vladeck, How the President’s “Clarifying” Memorandum Destroys the Case for the 
Entry Ban, JUSTSECURITY (June 15, 2017, 8:01 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/ 
42166/presidents-clarifying-memorandum-destroys-case-entry-ban/ [https://perma.cc/6APK-
MZGL]). 
 2. Gerhard Peters & John T. Wooley, Presidential Debate at Washington University in 
St. Louis, Missouri, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Oct. 9, 2016), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=119038 [https://perma.cc/A79V-TLVW]; 
see also Peter Margulies, Bans, Borders, and Justice:  Judicial Review of Immigration Law in 
the Trump Administration at 35–48 (Roger Williams Univ. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 
177, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3029655 [https://perma.cc/E5DP-UDQQ] (arguing for a 
more searching judicial review of “extreme vetting” and the need to recognize the significant 
long-term impact of “extreme vetting”). 
 3. Peters & Wooley, supra note 2. 
 4. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017) [hereinafter January 27, 
2017, Order]. 
 5. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). 
 6. January 27, 2017, Order, supra note 4, §§ 3, 5(c). 
 7. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 760 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (alleging 
violations of the Establishment Clause, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth Amendment (both procedural and substantive claims), the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 
578–79 (4th Cir.) (claiming violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Refugee Act, 
and the Administrative Procedure Act), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017); Washington, 
847 F.3d at 1157, 1165, 1167 (alleging that the Executive Order violates that First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause, due process, and equal protection); Darweesh v. Trump, 
17 Civ. 480 (AMD), 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017) (alleging that the Executive 
Order violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses). 
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January 27, 2017, Order.8  However, it left the extreme vetting provisions of 
the January 27, 2017, Order in place,9 and, in fact, expanded the vetting 
requirements in several respects.10  The extreme vetting requirements of the 
March 6, 2017, Order are now most fully articulated in section 5, titled 
“Implementing Uniform Screening and Vetting Standards for All 
Immigration Programs.”11 
The travel restrictions and the vetting requirements were expanded yet 
again in a third iteration of the “Muslim Ban,” also referred to as the “Travel 
Ban” or the “Entry Ban.”  On September 24, 2017, shortly before oral 
argument was scheduled for the U.S. Supreme Court on October 10, 2017, in 
the consolidated Travel Ban cases of Trump v. Hawaii and Trump v. 
International Refugee Assistance Project,12 President Trump signed a new 
Proclamation (the “September 24, 2017, Order”).13  The September 24, 2017, 
Order is titled, “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting 
Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety 
Threats.”14  Thus, the most recent Order, as implied by the title, focuses more 
squarely on the extreme vetting provisions set forth by the prior Orders.  
More specifically, sections 1(a) through (h) of the September 24, 2017, Order 
focus on “identity-management and information-sharing capabilities, 
protocols, and practices” related to immigration screening and vetting.15  The 
next day, the Court ordered briefing as to whether the Travel Ban cases that 
had been scheduled for oral argument on October 10, 2017, were moot.16  At 
the time of publication, the litigation remains ongoing, including challenges 
to the September 24, 2017, Order.17 
 
 8. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) [hereinafter March 6, 
2017, Order]. 
 9. Id. §§ 1–2; see also id. § 5 (“Implementing Uniform Screening and Vetting Standards 
for All Immigration Programs”). 
 10. Compare id., with January 27, 2017, Order, supra note 4, § 4. 
 11. March 6, 2017, Order, supra note 8, § 5. 
 12. 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017). 
 13. Presidential Proclamation, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for 
Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats 
(Sept. 24, 2017) [hereinafter “September 24, 2017, Order”], https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2017/09/24/enhancing-vetting-capabilities-and-processes-detecting-attempted-
entry [https://perma.cc/R678-KL5F]. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.; see also infra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security definition of “identity management”).   
 16. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, Nos. 16-1436, 16-1540, slip op. (U.S. Sept. 
25, 2017), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/092517zr_jiel.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/24F6-5MFB] (ordering parties to file letter briefs addressing whether, or to 
what extent, the Proclamation issued on September 24, 2017, may render the consolidated 
cases moot). 
 17. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 26–27, Iranian Alliances 
Across Borders, Univ. of Md. Coll. Park Chapter v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-02921-GJH (D. Md. 
Oct. 2, 2017) (seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the September 24, 2017, Order 
and alleging that the Order violates the antidiscrimination provision of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (2012)); Letter from ACLU to Hon. Theodore D. 
Chuang, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Md. (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/letter/irap-
v-trump-pmc-letter [https://perma.cc/KKL8-DM8W] (seeking to amend the complaint in 
International Refugee Assistance Project in light of the September 24, 2017, Order); see also 
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Regardless of the final disposition of these litigation matters, it is 
significant to note that the extreme vetting provisions of the original and 
revised Executive Orders have received less judicial attention than the travel 
restrictions.18  The extreme vetting provisions do not appear to be dependent 
upon the authority of the Orders, and are presented in the Orders as an 
evolving and prospective administrative matter.19  Thus, the vetting 
provisions of the March 6, 2017, Order and the September 24, 2017, Order 
may not be fully challenged.20 
This Article focuses on the long-term impact of modern vetting 
requirements, such as those prescribed in the Executive Orders referenced 
above,21 and other immigration-related screening protocols that are 
increasingly algorithmically anchored.  It contends that the implementation 
of expanded vetting protocols22 risks implications that may be 
undertheorized due to an underappreciation of the mass cybersurveillance 
and disparate-impact consequences that surround current screening measures 
broadly promulgated by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  
Specifically, this Article advances the claim that DHS vetting and screening 
 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. 
Sch. of Law v. U.S. Dep’t. of State, No. 1:17-cv-07520 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2017) (seeking 
disclosure of reports referred to in sections 1(c) and 1(h) of the September 24, 2017, Order, 
pursuant to the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 
(2012)). 
 18. Litigation surrounding the March 6, 2017, Order addressed sections 2 and 6, which 
bar the entry of travelers from six designated countries and limit refugee admissions. See 
Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 757–59; Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 574–75. 
 19. The implementation of “extreme vetting” measures appears to be underway. See 
Notice of Modified Privacy Act System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 179 (Sept. 18, 2017); 60-
Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection: Supplemental Questions for Visa Applicants, 
82 Fed. Reg. 148 (Aug. 3, 2017). 
 20. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 1; Margulies, supra note 2.  Increasing attention has been 
focused on the efficacy of the social media screening of immigration vetting protocols. See, 
e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-17-40, DHS’ PILOTS FOR 
SOCIAL MEDIA SCREENING NEED INCREASED RIGOR TO ENSURE SCALABILITY AND LONG-TERM 
SUCCESS (2017), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-17-40-
Feb17.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ACP-GU2G]; Lily Hay Newman, Feds Monitoring Social 
Media Does More Harm Than Good, WIRED (Sept. 28, 2017, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/dhs-social-media-immigrants-green-card/ 
[https://perma.cc/2FC5-FPKC]. 
 21. January 27, 2017, Order, supra note 4, § 4; March 6, 2017, Order, supra note 8, § 5; 
September 24, 2017, Order, supra note 13, § 1(a)-(h). 
 22. As a presidential candidate, Trump announced his plans to implement a program of 
“extreme vetting” of immigrants and refugees in a campaign speech on the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in August 2016. See Jeremy Diamond, Trump Proposes Values Test for 
Would-Be Immigrants in Fiery ISIS Speech, CNN (Aug. 15, 2016, 9:39 PM) 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/14/politics/donald-trump-isis-fight/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/8GU4-9AEK].  Several scholars have observed that the president enjoys 
wide powers in the exercise of immigration law and policy, especially through executive 
action. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 
119 YALE L.J. 458, 500 (2009); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and 
Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 108 (2015). 
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protocols risk introducing an algorithmically driven and technologically 
enhanced form of Jim Crow.23   
Unlike the “separate but equal”24 de jure discrimination25 of a historic Jim 
Crow regime, Algorithmic Jim Crow risks imposing both de jure and de facto 
discrimination26 through an “equal but separate”27 regime.  This Article 
explains how Algorithmic Jim Crow is an outgrowth of a digital era that 
 
 23. See generally JONATHAN SCOTT HOLLOWAY, JIM CROW WISDOM:  MEMORY AND 
IDENTITY IN BLACK AMERICA SINCE 1940 (2013); JUMPIN’ JIM CROW:  SOUTHERN POLITICS 
FROM CIVIL WAR TO CIVIL RIGHTS (Jane Dailey et al. eds., 2000); Mattias Smångs, Doing 
Violence, Making Race:  Southern Lynching and White Racial Group Formation, 121 AM. J. 
SOC. 1329 (2016).  For contemporary discussions on the complexity of what has been termed 
a “post-racial” America, see generally DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE?  
RETHINKING RACE IN “POST-RACIAL” AMERICA (2013); THE NEW BLACK:  WHAT HAS 
CHANGED—AND WHAT HAS NOT—WITH RACE IN AMERICA (Kenneth W. Mack & Guy-Uriel 
E. Charles eds., 2013); Charlton McIlwain, Racial Formation, Inequality and the Political 
Economy of Web Traffic, 20 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 1073 (2016); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, 
Policing the Boundaries of Whiteness:  The Tragedy of Being “Out of Place” from Emmett 
Till to Trayvon Martin, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1113 (2017); Camille Gear Rich, Marginal 
Whiteness, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1497 (2010); infra Part I.A. 
 24. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (“[W]e cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the 
separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable . . . .”). 
 25. The Supreme Court has characterized de jure discrimination as encompassing state-
sanctioned or state-imposed discrimination under the law, prohibited under the Equal 
Protection Clause. See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 490 (explaining that the Fourteenth 
Amendment “proscrib[es] all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race”). 
 26. Nonracial classifications that result in de facto discrimination or disparate-impact 
discrimination may not be found to violate the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977) (explaining that the 
party asserting an equal protection violation bears the burden to show that the governmental 
action was intended to discriminate against a suspect or protected class); Milliken v. Bradley, 
418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (distinguishing de jure and de facto segregation with express and 
explicit policies that articulate race-based distinctions defined as de jure discrimination); see 
also Frank I. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation:  A Constitutional and Empirical 
Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 275 (1972); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and 
Disparate Impact:  Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494, 496–97 (2003). 
 27. See infra Part III.A. 
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exploits cybersurveillance28 and dataveillance29 systems that are rapidly 
proliferating in both the public30 and private sectors.31 
This Article demonstrates how immigration-related vetting and database 
screening protocols utilize newly developed big data32 screening, tracking, 
and profiling tools that attempt to verify identity and assess future risk.33  
These tools are now actively deployed by DHS34 and utilize databases 
 
 28. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 209 (2006) (“[Cybersurveillance 
is] the process by which some form of human activity is analyzed by a computer according to 
some specified rule . . . .  [T]he critical feature in each [case of surveillance] is that a computer 
is sorting data for some follow-up review by some human.”). 
 29. See generally Roger A. Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, 31 COMM. 
ACM 498 (1988).  Roger Clarke describes dataveillance as “the systematic use of personal 
data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or 
more persons.” Id. at 499; see also DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES:  AN OVERVIEW 16 
(2007) (“Being much cheaper than direct physical or electronic surveillance[, dataveillance] 
enables the watching of more people or populations, because economic constraints to 
surveillance are reduced.  Dataveillance also automates surveillance.  Classically, government 
bureaucracies have been most interested in gathering such data . . . .”). 
 30. See, e.g., GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE:  EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND 
THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE 6 (2014).  See generally SHANE HARRIS, @WAR:  THE RISE OF 
THE MILITARY-INTERNET COMPLEX (2014); LYON, supra note 29; DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M. 
ARKIN, TOP SECRET AMERICA:  THE RISE OF THE NEW AMERICAN SECURITY STATE (2011); 
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD:  RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANXIOUS 
AGE (2005); Deven R. Desai, Constitutional Limits on Surveillance:  Associational Freedom 
in the Age of Data Hoarding, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579 (2014); Anil Kalhan, Immigration 
Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1 (2014); Paul Ohm, Electronic Surveillance Law and the Intra-
Agency Separation of Powers, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 269 (2012); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers 
of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013). 
 31. See, e.g., JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION:  A QUEST FOR PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND 
FREEDOM IN A WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE 17–18 (2014); ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., 
NO PLACE TO HIDE, 221–23 (2005); see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers:  
How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for 
Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 596 (2004); Jeffrey Rosen, The 
Deciders:  Facebook, Google, and the Future of Privacy and Free Speech, in CONSTITUTION 
3.0:  FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 69, 69–72 (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes 
eds., 2011). 
 32. See generally ROB KITCHIN, THE DATA REVOLUTION:  BIG DATA, OPEN DATA, DATA 
INFRASTRUCTURES & THEIR CONSEQUENCES (2014); VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & 
KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA:  A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, 
AND THINK (2013); PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD:  FRAMEWORKS FOR 
ENGAGEMENT (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014). 
 33. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE 
FUTURE ATTRIBUTE SCREENING TECHNOLOGY (FAST)/PASSIVE METHODS FOR PRECISION 
BEHAVIORAL SCREENING 5 (2011), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia 
_st_fast-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQ4W-VM5P]. 
 34. See, e.g., Refugee Processing and Security Screening, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. 
SERVICES (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/refugeescreening [https://perma.cc/4Z6R-
C3QQ]. 
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operated by the military35 and intelligence communities.36  Currently, vetting 
and screening protocols often begin with biometric identification37—for 
example, the digital collection and screening of scanned fingerprints through 
federal and state biometric databases in the United States and international 
biometric databases, such as those operated by ICPO-INTERPOL 
(Interpol).38  Biometric data currently collected by DHS include scanned 
fingerprints39 and irises,40 digital photos for facial recognition technology,41 
and DNA.42 
Consequently, implementation of extreme vetting protocols will likely 
include proposals for a tamper-resistant and fraud-proof biometric electronic 
identity card,43 such as a biometric ePassport.44  The Trump administration’s 
Executive Orders, for example, specifically mandate “Expedited Completion 
of the Biometric Entry-Exit Tracking System” by DHS.45  As part of new 
 
 35. Current refugee vetting procedures include database screening through the U.S. 
Department of Defense’s Defense Forensics and Biometrics Agency’s (DFBA) Automated 
Biometric Identification System (ABIS). Id. (“A biometric record check of the Department of 
Defense’s (DOD) records collected in areas of conflict (predominantly Iraq and Afghanistan).  
DOD screening began in 2007 for Iraqi applicants and has now been expanded to all 
nationalities.”).  
 36. Current refugee vetting procedures include database screening through the “National 
Counterterrorism Center/Terrorist Screening Center (terrorist watch lists)” and the “FBI 
Fingerprint Check through Next Generation Identification (NGI).” Id. 
 37. Biometrics is “[t]he science of automatic identification or identity verification of 
individuals using physiological or behavioral characteristics.” JOHN VACCA, BIOMETRIC 
TECHNOLOGIES AND VERIFICATION SYSTEMS 589 (2007). 
 38. See Databases, INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/ 
Databases [https://perma.cc/RVM3-JKJ6] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
 39. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE 
AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (IDENT) 15 (2012), https://www.dhs.gov/ 
sites/default/files/publications/privacy/PIAs/privacy_pia_usvisit_ident_appendixj_jan2013.p
df [https://perma.cc/2LW4-PJSS]; Office of Biometric Identity Management Identification 
Services, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/obim-biometric-identification-
services [https://perma.cc/VN5T-H6UH] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
 40. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE IRIS AND 
FACE TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION AND EVALUATION (IFTDE) 2 (2010), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy_pia_st_iftde.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A9MP-CRCF]. 
 41. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE 
STANDOFF TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATION AND DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM:  BIOMETRIC OPTICAL 
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM TESTS 2 (2012), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 
privacy_pia_st_stidpboss_dec2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7XK-EDK9]. 
 42. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE RAPID 
DNA SYSTEM 2 (2013), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-
rapiddna-20130208.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9NN-F4PL]. 
 43. See, e.g., Charles E. Schumer & Lindsey O. Graham, The Right Way to Mend 
Immigration, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/17/AR2010031703115.html [https://perma.cc/Y5GF-WE2M] 
(“We would require all U.S. citizens and legal immigrants who want jobs to obtain a high-
tech, fraud-proof Social Security card.  Each card’s unique biometric identifier would be stored 
only on the card . . . .”). 
 44. See, e.g., Eric Markowitz, Retina Scanners and Biometric Passports:  A Look at the 
Futuristic Tech That Could Scan Refugees, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2015, 11:29 AM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/retina-scanners-biometric-passports-look-futuristic-tech-could-scan-
refugees-2199960 [https://perma.cc/6AZC-3EV9]. 
 45. March 6, 2017, Order, supra note 8, § 8; January 27, 2017, Order, supra note 4, § 7. 
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vetting protocols, DHS also seeks social media identification data46 and plans 
to seek social media user credentials,47 such as passwords to Facebook 
accounts of refugees and visa applicants.48  Newly developed “big data” 
cybersurveillance tools fuse biometric data with biographic data and internet 
and social media profiling to assess risk.49 
This Article aims to explain how big data vetting is mistakenly presented 
as a procedure that is restricted to noncitizens:  immigrants, refugee and 
asylum applicants, and visitors seeking a travel visa to the United States.  
Instead, such vetting is part of a web of technologies that DHS has termed 
“identity management.”50  The application of these technologies may 
eventually extend to the entire citizenry through a variety of policy proposals, 
including a biometric national identification system, and various mandatory 
vetting and database screening programs.  Identity-management programs 
attempt to authenticate identity and assess the risk factors across entire 
populations, including the U.S. citizenry.  Big data vetting, thus, is 
misunderstood as a protocol that is likely to be limited to immigration-related 
screening.  More accurately, such vetting includes an evolving form of big 
data surveillance that attempts to assess criminal and terroristic risk across 
entire populations and subpopulations through mass data collection, database 
screening and data fusion, artificial intelligence, and algorithm-driven 
predictive analytics.51 
 
 46. John Burnett, Former Immigration Director Defends U.S. Record on Refugee Vetting, 
NPR (Feb. 3, 2017, 4:35 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/03/513311323/former-
immigration-director-defends-u-s-record-on-refugee-vetting [https://perma.cc/U99Q-RWT5] 
(noting that the former director of the Office of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services of 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under the Obama administration “point[ed] out 
that his office had been checking Facebook, Twitter and Instagram accounts of prospective 
refugees from Syria and Iraq since 2015”). 
 47. Alexander Smith, U.S. Visitors May Have to Hand over Social Media Passwords:  
DHS, NBC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2017, 7:51 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/us-
visitors-may-have-hand-over-social-media-passwords-kelly-n718216 
[https://perma.cc/7WK4-FDKB]. 
 48. See id.; see also Notice of Modified Privacy Act System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 179 
(Sept. 18, 2017). 
 49. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 33; see also infra Part I.A. 
 50. DHS offers this definition of identity management: 
Identity Management (IdM) deals with identifying and managing individuals within 
a government, state, local, public, or private sector network or enterprise.  In 
addition, authentication and authorization to access resources such as facilities or, 
sensitive data within that system are managed by associating user rights, 
entitlements, and privileges with the established identity. 
Cyber Security Division Identity Management Program Video, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, 
https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/cyber-security-division-identity-management-
program-video [https://perma.cc/9NGG-8G28] (last visited Oct. 16, 2016). 
 51. See, e.g., STEVEN FINLAY, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS, DATA MINING AND BIG DATA:  
MYTHS, MISCONCEPTIONS AND METHODS 3 (2014); ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS:  THE 
POWER TO PREDICT WHO WILL CLICK, BUY, LIE, OR DIE 59–60 (2013); NATE SILVER, THE 
SIGNAL AND THE NOISE:  WHY SO MANY PREDICTIONS FAIL—BUT SOME DON’T 417–18 (2012); 
see also Spencer Woodman, Palantir Provides the Engine for Donald Trump’s Deportation 
Machine, INTERCEPT (Mar. 2, 2017, 1:18 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/03/02/palantir-
provides-the-engine-for-donald-trumps-deportation-machine/ [https://perma.cc/4B2H-JLHV] 
(reporting that the DHS awarded a private contractor a $41 million contract to build an 
“Investigative Case Management” system to allow DHS to “access a vast ‘ecosystem’ of data 
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The long-term consequences of modern big data surveillance can be better 
envisioned by anticipating how and why big data vetting protocols may be 
extended to the entire population.  Eventually, all residents of the United 
States, both citizens and noncitizens, may face various stages of 
technological vetting and algorithmic screening as a part of a post-September 
11, 2001, national security policy trajectory that embraces big data 
surveillance for its presumed efficacy.  Importantly, in parallel with the 
extreme vetting protocols mandated by the Executive Orders, almost every 
immigration reform effort since 9/11 has called for biometric data collection 
from the entire citizenry in the United States to enhance border security 
efforts.52  At the same time, increasing concern regarding homegrown 
terrorism has resulted in a call to extend domestic surveillance and 
counterterrorism efforts to both citizens and noncitizens.53  The Snowden 
disclosures, for example, have further revealed how foreign-intelligence-
gathering tools, such as bulk metadata collection, can be indiscriminate in 
scope and impact both citizens and noncitizens.54 
Identifying the vetting procedures embedded within Executive Order 
13,769 and the constitutional challenges which followed its promulgation is 
particularly appropriate as 2017 marks the seventy-fifth anniversary of the 
signing of Executive Order 9066 by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.55  
That order, issued on February 19, 1942, and titled “Authorizing the 
Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas,” allowed for Japanese 
internment by delegating to the Secretary of War the authority “to take such 
other steps as he . . . may deem advisable to enforce compliance” with the 
exclusion of Japanese Americans and those of Japanese ancestry.56 
The legal challenges mounted against Executive Order 9066 culminated in 
several U.S. Supreme Court cases, most notably, Korematsu v. United 
States.57  In this case, decided in 1944, the Court upheld the constitutionality 
 
to facilitate immigration officials in both discovering targets and then creating and 
administering cases against them”). 
 52. See Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. 1475, 1478–82 (2013). 
 53. See, e.g., Countering Violent Extremism, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (Jan. 19, 2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/countering-violent-extremism [https://perma.cc/5CS6-TL7X]; see also 
TREVOR AARONSON, THE TERROR FACTORY:  INSIDE THE FBI’S MANUFACTURED WAR ON 
TERRORISM 19 (2013); Colin Moynihan, A New York City Settlement on the Surveillance of 
Muslims, NEW YORKER (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-new-
york-city-settlement-on-surveillance-of-muslims [https://perma.cc/X6J9-Y2EQ] (“After the 
attacks of September 11, 2001, the New York Police Department began an intense surveillance 
operation that focused on Muslims in New York City . . . .  They eavesdropped on 
conversations in restaurants and cafes, catalogued memberships in mosques and student 
organizations, and . . . tried to bait people into making inflammatory statements.”). 
 54. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection:  Statutory and Constitutional 
Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 863–64 (2014); Laura K. Donohue, Section 
702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 117, 151–52, 157, 164 n.83, 202–19 (2015). 
 55. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. §§ 1092–93 (1942). 
 56. Id. 
 57. 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) 
(“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious 
to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”). 
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of Executive Order 9066, reasoning in part:  “[W]e are dealing specifically 
with nothing but an exclusion order.  To cast this case into outlines of racial 
prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were 
presented, merely confuses the issue.”58  Drawing comparisons between 
Executive Order 13,769 and Executive Order 9066, and reviewing the 
original justification for Japanese internment, is critical here as President 
Trump and others have cited both FDR’s actions59 and Korematsu as 
precedent for the Muslim Ban and the development of a Muslim registry 
database.60 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I describes how modern vetting 
procedures are intertwined with burgeoning identity-management systems.  
Based on a review of publicly available information, these vetting protocols 
are increasingly dependent upon the following:  mass biometric data 
collection, automated or semiautomated biometric identification, and 
algorithm-dependent database screening programs.  In a big data world, 
threat risk assessments and data-profiling tools do not necessarily begin with 
the identification of individuals on the basis of traditionally protected 
classifications, such as race, ethnicity, or national origin.  Instead, because 
contemporary big data systems are data-classification oriented, vetting and 
screening protocols begin with the identification of individuals on the basis 
of numerical identification, such as passport numbers, and on the basis of 
biometric identification, such as the cataloguing of scanned fingerprints and 
irises. 
Part II describes how national security programs risk creating forms of 
discrimination similar to Jim Crow in that they are also based upon 
classification and screening protocols.  Historic Jim Crow regimes started 
with a legal premise:  that certain individuals could and should be classified 
on the basis of race.  Next, Jim Crow laws utilized screening systems to 
enforce segregation based upon designated racial classification.  This 
discussion explores why security threat assessments produced through 
algorithms and database screening may—similar to historic Jim Crow—also 
separate populations based upon particular classifications.  New Algorithmic 
Jim Crow systems, like historic Jim Crow regimes, systems may present 
themselves as facially neutral. 
 
 58. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223. 
 59. “What I’m doing is no different than FDR,” Trump told ABC News during the 
presidential campaign. Meghan Keneally, Donald Trump Cites These FDR Policies to Defend 
Muslim Ban, ABC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2015, 1:01 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donald-
trump-cites-fdr-policies-defend-muslim-ban/story?id=35648128 [https://perma.cc/FY3H-
9NNE]. 
 60. Shortly after President Trump’s election, Carl Higbie, a former spokesman for the 
Great America Political Action Committee, stated on Fox News that a Muslim database 
registry would be legal and would “hold constitutional muster” under Korematsu, explaining, 
“We did it during World War II with the Japanese . . . .” Derek Hawkins, Japanese American 
Internment Is ‘Precedent’ for National Muslim Registry, Prominent Trump Backer Says, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2016/11/17/japanese-internment-is-precedent-for-national-muslim-registry-
prominent-trump-backer-says/ [https://perma.cc/SF5A-4HEK]. 
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Part III explains how identity-management systems do not necessarily 
discriminate based on protected categories recognized under equal protection 
jurisprudence.61  Rather, newly emerging vetting systems are often centered 
on big data and generally driven by mass data collection and analysis.  These 
systems, for instance, purport to be race neutral and not to target individuals 
based on a protected classification.  Rather, it is often the case that results of 
data screening and vetting analytics deemed suspect and anomalous are 
isolated and targeted.  Consequently, the “equal but separate” consequences 
of Algorithmic Jim Crow will allow for the “equal” vetting and screening of 
all citizens and noncitizens.  At the same time, newly deployed vetting 
systems will allow federal and state governments to “separate” individuals 
based upon the vetting and screening actions mandated through security 
policy developments. 
Part IV further discusses why advocates of immigration federalism62 and 
national security federalism63—those seeking the expansion of state 
participation in the enforcement of federal immigration and national security 
law—have increasingly enacted biometric data harvesting and identity-
management laws that mimic federal laws and programs.  These state laws 
mandate the utilization of multiple dataveillance tools and biometric data 
screening devices, purportedly to further crime and immigration control and 
simultaneously support counterterrorism efforts.  Yet, just as historic Jim 
Crow regimes delegated segregationist gatekeeping duties to state and private 
entities, contemporary immigration policy delegates restrictive immigration 
gatekeeping duties to state and private entities.  Under Algorithmic Jim 
 
 61. Equal protection jurisprudence and the foundations for differing standards of judicial 
review based upon protected classification has yielded rich scholarship. See generally JOHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 105–81 (1980); Bruce 
A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 714–16 (1985); Mario L. 
Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967 (2010); Katharine T. Bartlett, 
Tradition as Past and Present in Substantive Due Process Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 535, 540–
48 (2012); Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 
91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1294–97 (1982); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown:  The Law of Skin Color, 
49 DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal 
Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 219 (1991); Melissa Murray, Equal Rites and Equal Rights, 
96 CALIF. L. REV. 1395 (2008); Bertrall L. Ross II, The Representative Equality Principle:  
Disaggregating the Equal Protection Intent Standard, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 175 (2012); Jed 
Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1143 (2002); Kenji 
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748, 755–63 (2011). 
 62. Hiroshi Motomura is credited with introducing the term “immigration federalism” into 
academic discourse to describe state and local involvement in immigration. Peter J. Spiro, 
Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1627 (1997); see also 
Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism:  A 
Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074, 2096 (2013); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional 
Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 788 n.6 (2008) (crediting 
Motomura with “defining immigration federalism as ‘states and localities play[ing a role] in 
making and implementing law and policy relating to immigration and immigrants’” (citing 
Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration 
Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1361 (1999))). 
 63. See, e.g., Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 
STAN. L. REV. 289, 289 (2012); see also Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law:  What 
States Can and Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 475 
(2008). 
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Crow, these technologically enabled gatekeeping duties involve race-neutral 
database screening of personally identifiable data and biometric data through 
federal vetting and screening protocols.  The results, however, may not be 
race neutral, or may in fact have a disparate impact on traditionally protected 
classes. 
Part IV further explains how technological vetting protocols and 
algorithm-driven database screening systems may be insulated from 
successful legal challenges, as the law has not yet adapted to anticipate new 
forms of back-end discrimination facilitated by DHS’s rapid deployment of 
identity-management programs.  The government, as in Korematsu, will 
likely defend any disparate-impact consequences as necessary and justified 
based upon threat risk assessments and nonracial classifications.  Risk-based 
classifications and data characteristics deemed suspect fall outside of the 
protections recognized by current equal protection jurisprudence.  This type 
of disparate impact, driven by database screening and technologically 
enhanced discrimination, may face limited or lenient review by a federal 
judiciary that generally grants broad deference to the government in matters 
of immigration and national security.64  Thus, the advent of Algorithmic Jim 
Crow will require an evolution of equality law. 
This Article concludes that current algorithm-driven vetting and biometric-
biographic identification screening, especially once deployed across the 
entire citizenry, will likely lead to discriminatory profiling and surveillance 
on the basis of suspicious data as well as classification-based discrimination.  
These vetting and screening systems are likely to result in both direct and 
disparate discrimination, particularly based on race, color, ethnicity, national 
origin, and religion.  In addition, recent immigration-control policy and 
programs demonstrate the government’s interest in delegating immigration-
vetting duties to private actors, such as employers, and nonfederal actors, 
such as state and local law enforcement, which can exacerbate issues of racial 
profiling and discrimination. 
I.  BIRTH OF ALGORITHMIC JIM CROW 
When President Trump signed Executive Order 13,769 on January 27, 
2017, then-acting Attorney General Sally Yates was taken by surprise.65  
Yates reviewed the Order as well as a number of briefs by individuals who 
sought to enjoin the Order in federal court and believed that it raised 
constitutional problems—namely Establishment Clause and due process 
concerns.66  Yates later explained to the New Yorker that, after reviewing 
 
 64. See, e.g., Shirin Sinnar, Rule of Law Tropes in National Security, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
1566, 1569 (2016); see also Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the Community, 5 HARV. 
NAT’L SECURITY J. 147, 222 (2014) (discussing counterterrism law enforcement). 
 65. See Ryan Lizza, Why Sally Yates Stood Up to Trump, NEW YORKER (May 29, 2017), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/29/why-sally-yates-stood-up-to-trump 
[https://perma.cc/JHF9-73DM] (explaining that Yates learned of the Order upon being 
notified by a deputy who read the news online). 
 66. Id. (“Yates read through the briefs, and thought that two arguments against the order 
were particularly strong. . . .  [The order] arguably violated the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment.  And . . . there seemed to be serious due-process questions.”). 
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arguments for and against the first Order, she thought that her two choices 
were either to resign or to refuse to defend the Order.67  After reviewing the 
evidence, Yates believed that the Order was ultimately based on religion and 
said, “I thought back to Jim Crow laws, or literacy tests.  Those didn’t say 
that the purpose was to prevent African-Americans from voting.  But that’s 
what the purpose was.”68  Yates drafted a letter to her colleagues at the U.S. 
Department of Justice, in which she stated:  “At present, I am not convinced 
that the defense of the Executive Order is consistent with these 
responsibilities nor am I convinced that the Executive Order is lawful.”69  
Yates directed Department of Justice attorneys not to defend the Order until 
she determined that it was appropriate to act.70  A few hours later, Yates 
received a letter from the White House that informed her that she had been 
fired.71 
Yates’s invocation of Jim Crow deserves notice.  The former acting 
Attorney General concluded that the Executive Order might lead to a 
disparate impact on the basis of protected classifications such as national 
origin and religion.  At the same time, she also recognized that the Executive 
Order presented itself as facially neutral, much like the facially neutral 
literacy tests promulgated under Jim Crow laws that disproportionately 
burdened the voting rights of minority communities. 
Under historic Jim Crow, literacy tests, poll taxes, and other obstacles to 
voting rights were equally applied to all voters.72   Although these obstacles 
did not explicitly inquire into voters’ race, they nonetheless significantly 
disenfranchised minority communities.  Therefore, they served 
discriminatory ends even though the race of the voter was never technically 
a basis for denying access to the ballot.73 
Much like literacy tests and poll taxes, post-9/11 security initiatives may 
disproportionately impact minority communities even though they do not 
explicitly effectuate decisions based on protected attributes.  An inquiry into 
modern-day screening and vetting systems depends upon in an understanding 
of myriad post-9/11 national security programs and policy initiatives.  
Contemporary screening and vetting systems utilize algorithms to determine 
a wide range of questions, including identity and associational assessments, 
to gauge risk.  For example, extreme vetting systems like the one 
promulgated by the Executive Orders may bring about disproportionate 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Letter from Sally Yates, Acting Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to Dep’t of Justice 
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/30/us/document-Letter-From-
Sally-Yates.html [https://perma.cc/T7KF-HNUC]. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Lizza, supra note 65 (“The statement was sent to thousands of department employees 
around the country.  About four hours later, at around 9 P.M., McGahn’s office asked the 
senior Trump appointee to deliver a letter to Yates, notifying her that she had been fired.”). 
 72. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, State’s Rights, Last Rites, 
and Voting Rights, 47 CONN. L. REV. 481, 486 nn.23–24 (2014); Atiba R.Ellis, The Cost of the 
Vote:  Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, and the Price of Democracy, 86 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 1023, 1024 n.7 (2009). 
 73. Ellis, supra note 72, at 1040 n.79, 1041–50. 
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burdens on minority communities.  Potential discrimination facilitated or 
exacerbated by technological means appearing to be facially neutral may 
evade legal challenge requiring careful inquiry. 
 Because big data screening and tracking systems unfold in ways that are 
difficult to see—for example, through algorithm-driven determinations, 
internet-based database screening programs, and social media monitoring—
it is critical to explore how modern vetting protocols may be linked to 
preexisting post-9/11 identity-management systems that are dependent upon 
cybersurveillance and dataveillance tools.  To grasp how extreme vetting can 
be extended to the entire citizenry, it is helpful to compare No Fly database 
screening systems with potential extreme vetting database screening systems.  
For example, based on what is known of both programs, it appears that many 
of the database screening protocols overlap.74  Part I, therefore, explains how 
vetting systems will increasingly rely upon database screening, including 
universal biometric databases, to sweep entire populations and subsets within 
populations to assess terroristic and criminal risk. 
To better understand the Trump administration’s policy on extreme 
vetting, it is important to reconstruct the justification for such a policy based 
upon historical background and prior policy developments implemented 
during the Obama administration.  Many of the policies advanced by the 
Executive Order are not only an outgrowth of 9/11, but they are specifically 
reactive to the Paris attacks in November 2015 and the San Bernardino attack 
in December 2015.  Both terrorist events led to multiple immigration policy 
proposals and adjustments to current vetting procedures. 
On the evening of November 13, 2015, coordinated terrorist attacks were 
staged in Paris, France, which included mass shootings, suicide bombings, 
and hostage takings.75  According to news reports, the terrorist attacks left 
129 dead and 352 wounded, including ninety-nine in serious condition.76  
The terrorist group Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) immediately 
claimed responsibility.77 
According to news accounts, ISIS announced immediately after the Paris 
attacks that three teams of eight terrorists had carried them out.78  Seven of 
the terrorists were reportedly killed through self-detonated suicide bombs.79  
In the days following the attacks, intelligence reports indicated that at least 
 
 74. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 929 (N.D. Cal. 
2014) (“By this order, all defendants shall specifically and thoroughly query the databases 
maintained by them, such as the TSDB, TIDE, CLASS, KSTF, TECS, IBIS, TUSCAN, 
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 75. Adam Nossiter et al., Three Teams of Coordinated Attackers Carried Out Assault on 
Paris, Officials Say; Hollande Blames ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/world/europe/paris-terrorist-attacks.html 
[https://perma.cc/KSJ4-RLT5]. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Steve Almasy et al., Paris Massacre:  At Least 128 Killed in Gunfire and Blasts, 
French Officials Say, CNN (Nov. 14, 2015, 9:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/13/ 
world/paris-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/RU5V-Z3TM]. 
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three of the eight terrorists had used falsified passports.80  A passport found 
on the body of a terrorist who had died at the Stade de France (“National 
Stadium”) was reported to be an illegitimate Syrian passport and it was 
reported that the terrorist had allegedly claimed Syrian refugee status in 
France.81  Two other terrorists killed at the National Stadium allegedly 
carried false Turkish passports.82  By November 19, 2015, just six days after 
the attacks, the governors of thirty-one states had announced their refusal to 
admit or resettle Syrian refugees in their respective states.83 
One week after the Paris attacks, Michael Ignatieff, formerly the Edward 
R. Murrow professor of public policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and 
currently the rector and president of Central European University in 
Budapest, expressed a position widely held by many experts:  an international 
biometric identification system would help to address the refugee crisis in 
Europe and simultaneously serve national security interests.84  He stated that 
“[t]he world badly needs a new migratory regime—based around an 
internationally authorized biometric ID card, with a date of permitted entry 
and a mandatory exit.”85  On November 24, 2015, while standing next to 
then-President François Hollande of France less than two weeks after the 
Paris attacks, then-President Barack Obama announced that “the [U.S.] 
government was developing ‘biometric information and other technologies 
that can make [refugee identification] more accurate.’”86 
On December 2, 2015, fourteen people were killed and twenty-one were 
seriously injured in a terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California.87  The 
attack consisted of a mass shooting and an attempted bombing.88  The 
perpetrators, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, a married couple 
residing in California, targeted a San Bernardino County Department of 
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 84. See Michael Ignatieff, The Refugees and the New War, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Dec. 17, 
2015), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/12/17/refugees-and-new-war/ 
[https://perma.cc/5A9J-5L3V]. 
 85. Id.; see also Katie Worth, Can Biometrics Solve the Refugee Debate?, PBS (Dec. 2, 
2015), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/can-biometrics-solve-the-refugee-debate/ 
[https://perma.cc/XT36-TMK6]. 
 86. Markowitz, supra note 44. 
 87. Michael S. Schmidt & Richard Pérez-Peña, F.B.I. Treating San Bernardino Attack as 
Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/us/ 
tashfeen-malik-islamic-state.html [https://perma.cc/MRP4-KFPJ]. 
 88. Id. 
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Public Health holiday party.89  Farook, a Pakistani American U.S. citizen 
born in Illinois, was employed by the Department of Public Health.90  Malik 
was a Pakistani-born lawful permanent resident who had recently migrated 
to the United States.91  According to media accounts, the Muslim couple had 
been self-radicalized, inspired by ISIS.92 
On the same day as the San Bernardino attack, Paul Ryan, Speaker of the 
U.S. House of Representatives, explained that lawmakers were considering 
various legislative reforms to increase security vetting of refugees and 
immigrants in response to the threat of ISIS, including requiring countries “to 
issue smart e-passports with biometric chips.”93 
Less than one week later, in the immediate aftermath of the Paris and San 
Bernardino attacks, then-presidential candidate Trump called for what has 
been referred to as a “Muslim Ban” or “Travel Ban”:  an executive action that 
would prohibit entry of any Muslim into the United States.94  Trump did not 
provide specifics on how he would prohibit Muslims from entering the 
United States; however, he later clarified that the ban would be temporary to 
allow the government to assess its current immigration procedures and 
“suspend immigration from regions linked with terrorism.”95  Trump’s call 
for a “Muslim Ban” was followed by calls for surveillance of Muslim 
communities and mosques.96 
Six months later, on June 12, 2016, Omar Mateen, an Afghani American 
born in the United States, killed forty-nine people and wounded fifty-three in 
a shooting rampage at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida.97  According 
to news reports, Mateen had proclaimed allegiance to ISIS shortly before 
committing “the worst mass shooting in United States history.”98  In the wake 
of the Orlando attack, then-candidate Trump explained that the profiling of 
Muslims in the United States was necessary as a preemptive measure to 
prevent future attacks.99 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Lisa Lambert et al., House to Consider Changes to Visa Waiver Program, Including 
‘Smart’ Passports, REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2015, 8:16 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/ 
12/02/us-usa-congress-visas-idUSKBN0TL1CV20151202 [https://perma.cc/W32F-SLZR]. 
 94. See Diamond, supra note 1. 
 95. Associated Press, How Donald Trump’s Plan to Ban Muslims Has Evolved, FORTUNE 
(June 28, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/28/donald-trump-muslim-ban/ 
[https://perma.cc/X29Y-XCPM]. 
 96. See David Mark & Jeremy Diamond, Trump:  ‘I Want Surveillance of Certain 
Mosques,’ CNN (Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/21/politics/trump-muslims-
surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/78YW-SQEV]. 
 97. See Lizette Alvarez et al., Orlando Gunman Was ‘Cool and Calm’ After Massacre, 
Police Say, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/orlando-
shooting.html [https://perma.cc/8VX9-98WB]. 
 98. Lizette Alvarez & Richard Pérez-Peña, Orlando Gunman Attacks Gay Nightclub, 
Leaving 50 Dead, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/ 
13/us/orlando-nightclub-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/BP5N-6MHX]. 
 99. See Emily Schultheis, Donald Trump:  U.S. Must “Start Thinking About” Racial 
Profiling, CBS NEWS (June 19, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-after-
orlando-racial-profiling-not-the-worst-thing-to-do/ [https://perma.cc/8XG8-7E23]. 
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On August 16, 2016, Trump announced a proposal for the “extreme 
vetting” of immigrants and refugees in a campaign speech on ISIS.100  He 
explained:  “In the Cold War, we had an ideological screening test.  The time 
is long overdue to develop a new screening test for the threats we face today.  
I call it extreme vetting.  I call it extreme, extreme vetting.”101  Then, on 
August 31, 2016, Trump delivered an address on his proposed immigration 
policy.102  In addition to his promise to build a wall on the southern border 
of the United States and his reassertion that “Mexico will pay for the wall,” 
Trump explained that he would also implement a “biometric entry-exit 
system for tracking visa-holders.”103  These promises of enhanced national 
security and border security systems, as well as the various Executive Orders 
restricting travel, inherently represent technological developments in the 
promulgation of emerging cybersurveillance technologies and algorithmic-
driven screening and vetting protocols.  To draw parallels between historic 
Jim Crow and Algorithmic Jim Crow, this Article turns to an overview of Jim 
Crow. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF JIM CROW:  
CLASSIFICATION AND SCREENING SYSTEMS 
Artificial intelligence and algorithms are not usually perceived as resulting 
in discrimination.  In fact, they may appear to be equality-compliant or even 
equality-enhancing in that algorithmic screening and vetting can be applied 
equally across entire populations and subpopulations.  Screening and 
classification systems, however, even when facially neutral and 
algorithmically based, can lead to profound constitutional challenges.  The 
historical framing in this section is necessary to assist in the interrogation of 
new classification and screening systems that are flourishing under security 
rationales and presented as technologically objective and colorblind. 
Therefore, to better grasp why the framing of Algorithmic Jim Crow is 
now needed, Part II lays a factual predicate to explain the foundational legal 
premises for historic Jim Crow regimes.  Traditional Jim Crow laws first 
required the government—often state and county governments—to engage 
in formal and standardized protocols to assign racial classification to citizens 
of that state or county.  Once a racial classification system was determined 
under the law, screening protocols, also established under Jim Crow laws, 
enabled the separation of populations on the basis of that racial classification.  
Consequently, understanding the basic mechanics of how separation was 
enforced under the law begins with an understanding of historic Jim Crow 
classification and screening systems. 
 
 100. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 1. 
 101. Diamond, supra note 22. 
 102. Emily Schultheis, Donald Trump Doubles Down in Immigration Speech:  “Mexico 
Will Pay for the Wall,” CBS NEWS (Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-
trump-delivers-immigration-speech-in-phoenix/ [https://perma.cc/E59J-RR2S]. 
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A.  Historical Framing of Jim Crow 
This overview is not intended to be an exhaustive history of the legal issues 
and the nature of Jim Crow—other scholarship has addressed that subject in 
thoughtful detail.104  Instead, this background intends to sketch out an 
understanding of the scope and context of the Jim Crow era and to further 
clarify that its laws and policies were not confined merely to segregating 
locational sites and imposing restrictions on movement.  Rather, Jim Crow 
was: 
[A] structure of exclusion and discrimination devised by white Americans 
to be employed principally against black Americans . . . .  Its central 
purpose was to maintain a second-class social and economic status for 
blacks while upholding a first-class social and economic status for 
whites. . . .  In the South, Jim Crow discrimination at its height existed not 
only by statute but by custom and racial ‘etiquette,’ and it was rigidly 
enforced by both the law enforcement agencies and courts as well as by 
ordinary white citizens who were neither policemen nor judges but who 
often took the law into their own hands as though they were.105 
 
 104. See generally 1 RACE, LAW, AND AMERICAN HISTORY 1700–1990:  AFRICAN 
AMERICANS AND THE LAW (Paul Finkelman ed., 1992); FRANK J. SCATURRO, THE SUPREME 
COURT’S RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION:  A DISTORTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE (2000); STEPHEN L. WASBY ET AL., DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO 
ALEXANDER (1977); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d rev. ed. 
2002); Gabriel J. Chin, Jim Crow’s Long Goodbye, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 107 (2004); Gabriel 
J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority:  Jim Crow and the Counter-
Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 65 (2008); James W. Fox, Jr., Doctrinal 
Myths and the Management of Cognitive Dissonance:  Race, Law, and the Supreme Court’s 
Doctrinal Support of Jim Crow, 34 STETSON L. REV. 293 (2005); James W. Fox, Jr., 
Intimations of Citizenship:  Repressions and Expressions of Equal Citizenship in the Era of 
Jim Crow, 50 HOW. L.J. 113 (2006); Rachel D. Godsil, Race Nuisance:  The Politics of Law 
in the Jim Crow Era, 105 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2006); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness:  
Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998); 
Trina Jones, Brown II:  A Case of Missed Opportunity?, 24 L. & INEQ. 9 (2006); José Roberto 
Juárez, Jr., Recovering Texas History:  Tejanos, Jim Crow, Lynchings & the University of 
Texas School of Law, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 85 (2010); Kenneth W. Mack, Foreword:  A Short 
Biography of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 67 SMU L. REV. 229 (2014); Kenneth W. Mack, 
Law, Society, Identity, and the Making of the Jim Crow South:  Travel and Segregation on 
Tennessee Railroads, 1875–1905, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 377 (1999) [hereinafter Mack, Law, 
Society, Identity]; Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the 
Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256 (2005); David Martin, The Birth of Jim Crow in 
Alabama 1865–1896, 13 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 184 (1993); Jennifer Roback, Southern Labor Law 
in the Jim Crow Era:  Exploitative or Competitive, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1984); Benno C. 
Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice:  The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era.  
Part 1:  The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 444 (1982); Barbara Y. Welke, Beyond 
Plessy:  Space, Status, and Race in the Era of Jim Crow, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 267; John W. 
Wertheimer et al., “The Law Recognizes Racial Instinct”:  Tucker v. Blease and the Black-
White Paradigm in the Jim Crow South, 29 L. & HIST. REV. 471 (2011); Joseph R. Palmore, 
Note, The Not-So-Strange Career of Interstate Jim Crow:  Race, Transportation, and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 1878–1946, 83 VA. L. REV. 1773 (1997); Anders Walker, Jim 
Crow’s Unwritten Code, JOTWELL (Jan. 16, 2017), https://legalhist.jotwell.com/jim-crows-
unwritten-code/ [https://perma.cc/K4EH-J6K7]. 
 105. JERROLD M. PACKARD, AMERICAN NIGHTMARE:  THE HISTORY OF JIM CROW vii–viii 
(2002).  For other sources on the history and impact of Jim Crow, see generally F. MICHAEL 
HIGGINBOTHAM, GHOSTS OF JIM CROW:  ENDING RACISM IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA (2013); 
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One scholar explains that Jim Crow is a term for “a series [of] laws and 
ordinances passed by Southern states and municipalities between 1877 and 
1965 legalizing segregation (the physical separation of individuals based on 
race, gender, religion, or class) within their boundaries.”106  Although racial 
discrimination was not a solely Southern practice—African Americans in 
Northern states experienced discrimination in housing, education, 
employment, and economic settings107—in the South, racial restrictions were 
omnipresent and ingrained in Southern life.108  One historian argues that Jim 
Crow “was a Southern phenomenon, the infrastructure white Southerners 
built to preserve, insofar as humanly possible, the old master/slave 
system.”109 
Jim Crow penetrated every facet of life for Southern African Americans:  
it was an integral part of the social, political, and legal fabric of Southern 
society.110  Jim Crow established restrictions on marriage,111 voting,112 
 
HOLLOWAY, supra note 23; KIMBERLEY JOHNSON, REFORMING JIM CROW:  SOUTHERN POLITICS 
AND STATE IN THE AGE BEFORE BROWN (2010); STETSON KENNEDY, JIM CROW GUIDE:  THE 
WAY IT WAS (Fl. Atl. Univ. Press 1990) (1959); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO 
CIVIL RIGHTS:  THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); PAULI 
MURRAY, STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR (1950); REMEMBERING JIM CROW:  AFRICAN 
AMERICANS TELL ABOUT LIFE IN THE SEGREGATED SOUTH (William H. Chafe et al. eds., 2001); 
THE FOLLY OF JIM CROW:  RETHINKING THE SEGREGATED SOUTH (Stephanie Cole & Natalie J. 
Ring eds., 2012); LESLIE V. TISCHAUSER, JIM CROW LAWS (2012); WOODWARD, supra note 
104; RICHARD WORMSER, THE RISE AND FALL OF JIM CROW (2003); Stephen Ansolabehere & 
Samuel Issacharoff, The Story of Baker v. Carr, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 271 
(Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009); Cheryl I. Harris, The Story of Plessy v. Ferguson:  The 
Death and Resurrection of Racial Formalism, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES, supra at 187. 
 106. TISCHAUSER, supra note 105, at 1.  For an overview of state laws on race during the 
Jim Crow era, see generally MURRAY, supra note 105. 
 107. PACKARD, supra note 105, at 64. 
 108. See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 105, at 21–34, 38–50, 77–117, 164–95, 198–211, 237–
50, 329–48, 406–22, 427–56, 461–90 (detailing state laws on race in effect during the Jim 
Crow era in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia); PACKARD, 
supra note 105, at 62–65; TISCHAUSER, supra note 105, at 35–37; see also THOMAS PEARCE 
BAILEY, RACE ORTHODOXY IN THE SOUTH AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE NEGRO QUESTION 92–
93 (1914) (describing “the racial creed of the Southern people”). 
 109. PACKARD, supra note 105, at 64. 
 110. Id. at 64–65. 
 111. See KENNEDY, supra note 105, at 63–71; TISCHAUSER, supra note 105, at 150–51; 
James R. Browning, Anti-Miscegenation Laws in the United States, 1 DUKE B.J. 26, 31 (1951); 
Paul A. Lombardo, Miscegenation, Eugenics, and Racism:  Historical Footnotes to Loving v. 
Virginia, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421, 425–26 & n.18 (1988) (discussing judicial decisions 
supporting antimiscegenation laws); see also Loving v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 78, 83 
(Va. 1966) (upholding Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute).  But see Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because 
of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 112. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 105, at 147–64; KLARMAN, supra note 105, at 28–39; 
TISCHAUSER, supra note 105, at 47–50; Ansolabehere & Issacharoff, supra note 105, at 297; 
see also Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898) (concluding that state 
constitutional requirements of poll taxes and literacy for voting did not discriminate based on 
race).  But see Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (“We conclude that a 
State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes 
the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard. . . .  [T]he Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains the States from fixing voter 
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education,113 employment,114 housing,115 travel,116 and enforced segregation 
in public spaces.117  Some of these restrictions were codified in law, and 
others were ingrained as a matter of social behavior and custom.118  Jim Crow 
“stood for an entire culture based on violence, racism, and fear that affected 
the life of every African American living in the South.”119  Despite the 
passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, Supreme 
Court precedent in the wake of those amendments upheld laws that enforced 
racial inequality through segregation laws, or laws that created a 
disproportionately discriminatory impact on African Americans.120 
Racial classification was an integral part of Jim Crow.121  The majority of 
the Southern states legalized racial classification by codifying the “one-drop” 
rule or enshrining it as part of their state constitutions:  any modicum of black 
ancestry meant that the individual in question was not white, and thus subject 
 
qualifications which invidiously discriminate.”); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 
154–56 (1965) (finding that state constitutional provisions that require voters to satisfy voting 
registrars that they understand and can interpret the U.S. or Louisiana constitutions violate the 
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under the Fifteenth Amendment); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 151 (1965) 
(concluding that the attorney general has the power to sue a state and state officials to protect 
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 113. See KENNEDY, supra note 105, at 86–108; TISCHAUSER, supra note 105, at 38–46, 
116–17 (discussing the impact of Jim Crow policies in education).  But see Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that segregation of public educational facilities 
results in deprivation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and that 
“[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal”); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 
339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634–35 (1950). 
 114. See KENNEDY, supra note 105, at 109–30. 
 115. See TISCHAUSER, supra note 105, at 68–69 (“Some towns excluded all people of color 
from residing anywhere within their boundaries, or, in the case of ‘sundown towns,’ had laws 
making it a crime for people of color to be found within city limits after 8:00 p.m.”).  But cf. 
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948). 
 116. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896), overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. 
483; KENNEDY, supra note 105, at 178–89; A. K. Sandoval-Strausz, Travelers, Strangers, and 
Jim Crow:  Law, Public Accommodations, and Civil Rights in America, 23 L. & HIST. REV. 
53, 54 (2005); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964). 
 117. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 105, at 190–202; TISCHAUSER, supra note 105, at 68 
(“By 1920, Southern state legislatures and governors had passed more than 350 segregation 
laws . . . [that] separated people by race in cemeteries, churches, hospitals, labor unions, 
prisons, offices, factories, mines, parks, public buildings, railway trains, railway station 
waiting rooms, housing developments, neighborhoods, schools, stores, streetcars, theaters, 
funeral parlors, and any other places people could meet.”); Harris, supra note 105, at 187.  See 
generally PACKARD, supra note 105. 
 118. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 105, at 203–27 (discussing “[t]he [d]ictates of [r]acist 
[e]tiquette”).  See generally REMEMBERING JIM CROW, supra note 105. 
 119. See TISCHAUSER, supra note 105, at 2. 
 120. See, e.g., Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 222–25 (1898); Plessy, 163 U.S. at 
544; The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25–26 (1883). 
 121. See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW:  THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 81–86 
(rev. ed. 2006) (discussing segregation era laws and arguing that law “constructs racial 
differences on several levels through the promulgation and enforcement of rules that determine 
permissible behavior”); PACKARD, supra note 105, at 94–100 (discussing racial definitions and 
state laws identifying which citizens were not considered white); Gross, supra note 104, at 
177–78; Jones, supra note 61, at 1487, 1495–96 & nn.25–26; see also infra note 122. 
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to Jim Crow laws.122  Definitions of race were also included in 
antimiscegenation laws, which prohibited interracial marriage.123  Virginia, 
for example, adopted a law that required racial descriptions to be recorded at 
a child’s birth to further classify individuals as “white” or “colored.”124  
Virginia’s Racial Integrity Act of 1924125 “required all citizens within the 
state born after June 14, 1912 to register their racial composition with the 
Bureau of Vital Statistics,”126 prohibited interracial marriages, and defined 
who exactly qualified as “white.”127  A copy of an old birth record form 
provided by the Library of Virginia describes the definition of “white” under 
Virginia law:  “A white person is one with no trace whatever of blood of 
another race, except that one with one-sixteenth of the blood of American 
Indian, unmixed with other race, may be classed as white.”128 
Thus, the Jim Crow system depended on initial classification and markers 
of racial identity to determine who would be subjected to laws that designated 
individual treatment, rights, and privileges based on those classifications.129 
B.  Classification and Screening 
Classification of identity, such as the race-based types that occurred during 
the Jim Crow era, is an essential step in establishing exclusionary systems.130  
 
 122. See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. of 1907, art. XXIII, § 11; ALA. CODE tit. 1, § 2 (1940); ARK. 
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91 MINN. L. REV. 592 (2007). 
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 124. See An Act to Preserve Racial Integrity, ch. 371, § 5, 1924 Va. Acts 534, 535 (repealed 
1975), invalidated in part by Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see also Richard B. 
Sherman, “The Last Stand”:  The Fight for Racial Integrity in Virginia in the 1920s, 54 J. 
SOUTHERN HIST. 69, 70–71 (1988). 
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 127. Id. at 369–70. 
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Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 1882–1910, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 26 (2000); 
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Exclusion involves separating out individuals from a group or one group 
from another category.  It is not possible to exclude a group from a system of 
rights and privileges without first determining criteria for exclusion.131  
Therefore, classification is necessary for these systems’ operation.132  During 
the Jim Crow era, these classifications took the form of “one-drop” laws, or 
legal decisions that identified who was “colored” and who was not.133  Other 
exclusionary systems have engaged in similar forms of classification.  For 
example, Apartheid in South Africa relied on national identity cards that 
identified individuals by racial groups.134  During the Belgian colonial period 
in Rwanda, officials mandated “Hutu” and “Tutsi” markers on identity cards 
in a system that privileged Tutsi individuals and ultimately laid the 
groundwork for the 1994 genocide.135  In Nazi Germany, the Nuremburg 
laws determined who was Jewish and thus subject to exclusion, 
discrimination, and persecution.136 
Classification alone, however, is not sufficient to operate an exclusionary 
system.  Implementing such a system requires screening:  determining 
whether individuals who have been classified are complying with the rules 
that accompany such classification or whether the individuals are somehow 
“suspect.”  Under Jim Crow, for example, screening was both official—such 
as official segregation policy enforcement—and unofficial, as a part of social 
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REV. 81 (2014). 
 132. See, e.g., Jim Fussell, Prevent Genocide Int’l, Presentation to the Seminar Series of 
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and behavioral norms.137  Jim Crow-era screening was a “small data” world 
screening system, relying first on classification on paper documents, such as 
birth certificates or identity cards, or an examination of physical 
appearance,138 followed by screening to ensure that the excluded individuals 
complied with the systems of classification.139  In a big data world, systems 
of screening, such as the extreme vetting requirements of Trump’s Executive 
Orders, are capable of surveilling vast numbers of individuals based on data 
or other broad categories and then subsequently classifying them based on 
status.140  Essentially, screening is now theoretically “equal” and the 
classification system is “separate.” 
Failing to examine the underlying bases of classification and screening 
systems indicates an inherent level of trust in government systems that 
ultimately may lead to harmful consequences.141  Screening in a big data 
world serves as a form of technological interrogation and entrenches 
surveillance as a norm.142  Mass screenings of citizens in “collect it all” 
systems embed the structure of policing into the state in much the same way 
that Jim Crow embedded racial classifications and screenings of individuals 
based on race or perceived race.143  Big data systems seek suspicious data as 
a means of identifying and classifying suspicious persons.144  Broad 
population-based screening and mass surveillance promote fundamentally 
undemocratic surveillance norms.145  As Justice Sotomayor explained in her 
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dissenting opinion in Utah v. Strieff,146 random, suspicionless identity 
verifications by law enforcement on the street are inherently undemocratic:   
[T]his case tells everyone, white and black, guilty and innocent, that an 
officer can verify your legal status at any time.  It says that your body is 
subject to invasion while courts excuse the violation of your rights.  It 
implies that you are not a citizen of a democracy, but the subject of a 
carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged.147 
Further, some screening protocols may rely on rationales that are facially 
neutral but ultimately based on impermissible classifications.  In his 
concurring opinion in International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump,148 
Judge James Wynn pointed out that discrimination, even when “shrouded in 
layers of legality[,] is no less an insult to our Constitution than naked 
invidious discrimination.”149  Judge Wynn cited Dred Scott v. Sandford150 
and Korematsu v. United States151 as examples of judicial failures in response 
to exclusionary and discriminatory systems cloaked in legality.152  In the 
majority opinion, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had 
sufficiently alleged that nationality served as a proxy for religious 
discrimination153 and was a crude and ineffective measure for determining 
whether a threat existed.154  Indeed, in her decision to refuse to defend the 
first Executive Order, then-acting Attorney General Sally Yates considered 
that it bore a resemblance to Jim Crow laws.155 
Thus, systems of subordination, such as Jim Crow and Apartheid, depend 
on classifying who is privileged and who is not.  As discussed above, once a 
classification is emplaced, laws can require separation, subordination, and 
screening on the basis of that classification.  Jim Crow regimes used race-
based classifications to engage in a broad range of economic, social, and 
political exclusions under the law.156  The act of excluding or 
disenfranchising on the basis of race often required legally mandated 
 
Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy:  Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right 
to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 251 (2002). 
 146. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). 
 147. Id. at 2070–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  Strieff addressed whether the discovery of 
a valid arrest warrant was sufficiently attenuating such that evidence discovered during an 
initially unconstitutional investigatory stop was admissible. Id. at 2059 (majority opinion). 
 148. 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017). 
 149. Id. at 612 (Wynn, J., concurring). 
 150. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 151. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 152. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 612 (Wynn, J., concurring). 
 153. See id. at 591–92 (majority opinion) (discussing the evidence that “national security 
is not the true reason for EO-2,” including statements made by Trump as a candidate, 
statements made by his advisors after he assumed office, and the issuance of both the first and 
second Executive Orders); see also id. at 613 (Wynn, J., concurring) (“[T]he Executive Order 
here relies on national origin as a proxy for discrimination based on religious animus . . . .”). 
 154. See id. at 596 (majority opinion) (citing internal reports from the Department of 
Homeland Security and an amicus brief from former national security officials that concluded 
that nationality-based screening is an ineffective means of determining terroristic threat). 
 155. Lizza, supra note 65. 
 156. See supra Part II.B. 
658 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
screening processes157 as well as screening through social norms and 
behavior control.158  These screening processes would often require 
governments or their private delegates to screen individuals on the basis of 
race, and any failure to do so would often carry legal consequences as well 
as social penalties such as ostracization.159 
C.  Cyberarchitecture of Algorithmic Jim Crow 
Perhaps the easiest way to understand how the Jim Crow regime is being 
replicated in a big data world through Algorithmic Jim Crow is to consider 
the following scenario:  imagine substituting race-based classifications with 
classifications of digitally derived suspiciousness.  Rather than relying upon 
a targeted class, such as race, national origin, gender, or religion, as a sole 
basis for exclusion, big data allows for exclusion to be based on an 
abstraction, such as digitally inferred or algorithmically anchored guilt or 
suspicion.160  In addition, big data can aggregate protected classifications 
with other collected data.161  For example, biometric screening that uses soft 
biometric indicators, such as digital assessments of skin color and estimated 
age extracted from a digital photo, can combine race data proxies with other 
proxy variables to predict criminal or terroristic behavior (e.g., aggregating 
passport number and digital photo with data analysis of web browsing 
activity and social media presence).162  In addition, there are multiple 
components to extreme vetting, including, but not limited to, biometric 
identification,163 record linkage,164 information extraction,165 and predictive 
analytics.166  In some circumstances, these technologies allow for 
classification and then screening.  In other circumstances, these technologies 
allow for just the opposite:  screening, then classification. 
What is difficult to understand is how machine learning and artificial 
intelligence can replace human judgment in the classification and screening 
processes of Algorithmic Jim Crow regimes.  In a small data world, Jim Crow 
required a human to physically inspect the skin color of an individual to 
determine the race of that individual (e.g., a physician attesting to the race of 
an individual on a birth certificate).167  In the small data world, screening 
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processes also required human judgment (e.g., a county clerk inspecting birth 
certificates before issuing marriage licenses and marriage certificates to 
determine compliance with antimiscegenation laws).168 
In contrast, human involvement is not required to classify individuals in a 
big data world.  An individual can be classified as a potential criminal, 
terrorist, or threat risk based on digital data alone and digitized analysis such 
as algorithmic screening.  Algorithmic tools can analyze data to establish 
identity (e.g., a record-locator matching algorithm such as database screening 
systems that match names with passport numbers and other databases of 
personally identifiable information) and screen for suspicious digital profiles 
(e.g., combine passport information with stored data and real time data).169  
Stored data might include bulk telephony metadata170—databases that collect 
time, duration, and geolocation of calls—and other government records and 
private data, such as consumer activities.171  Real-time analytics can include 
situational awareness systems that attempt to analyze real-time video 
surveillance feeds that connect the monitored individual through facial 
recognition technology to that individual’s social media.172 
Hence, the nature of classification and screening capacities are radically 
different in a big data world.  Classification, therefore, can be based in part 
or in whole on artificial intelligence.  Similarly, screening in a big data world 
does not rely on human processes.  The No Fly List, for example, can be 
generated through database screening and digital watchlisting systems rather 
than human nomination.173  Thus, in a big data world, classification and 
screening protocols can be combined, digitized, and automated.  As a result, 
these big data classification and screening systems may be nearly impossible 
for a citizen to interrogate or challenge.174 
What is similar between big data and small data exclusionary regimes is 
that separation and segregation is at the heart of the processes.  What appears 
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to be—at the earliest stages of the big data governance phenomenon—purely 
national security motivated protocols, such as the No Fly List, might not 
appear to be a part of a larger segregationist regime.  At the earliest stages of 
Jim Crow, separation of the races was deemed necessary by the Court in 
Plessy v. Ferguson175 under security rationales to avoid race-based 
conflict.176  At the earliest stages of Algorithmic Jim Crow, isolating 
individuals based on data suspicions is also justified under security 
rationales—to prevent terrorism. 
Unlike historic Jim Crow, established to continue a racial hierarchy first 
instituted through slavery, big data regimes do not overtly seek to create 
subordinate social classes.  But that may well be the result.  Like under 
historic Jim Crow regimes, security needs are professed as justification.  
Even if we are not yet faced with a mature Algorithmic Jim Crow regime, it 
is important to recognize that Jim Crow laws took decades to develop into a 
pervasive legal system.177  With the benefit of hindsight, we now examine 
the full arc of Jim Crow, including the opportunity to revisit the legal 
precedent that allowed for segregation to take root and become 
normalized.178  Jim Crow did not commence with the segregation of every 
water fountain, swimming pool, bus, train, movie theater, hotel, or 
restaurant.179  Jim Crow did, however, eventually convert nearly every 
citizen into a race classification expert and screening specialist to comply 
with the laws.180  Jim Crow laws imposed a duty under law or social norms 
upon many entities—public, private, and individual citizens—to classify and 
screen.181 
How will classification and screening under Algorithmic Jim Crow, like 
historic Jim Crow, require classification and screening requirements under 
the law?  How will Algorithmic Jim Crow impose a legal duty upon public, 
private, and individual citizens to classify and screen?  Jim Crow laws 
mandated paper-based classifications such as attestation to racial 
classifications on birth certificates.182  Big data technologies, however, do 
not require discrete screening or classification procedures because of the 
nature of modern data tools.  Instead of separate processes that treat screening 
and classification as separate, big data tools have the capacity to execute both 
simultaneously. 
In a small data world, linearity was more common between classification 
and screening:  the former had to follow the latter as a matter of logic.  
Without racial classification, racial screening would not have been possible.  
Once an individual had been classified as white, privileges under Jim Crow 
logically followed that racial status.  With big data, assessments can be made 
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concurrently and, thus, consecutive processes are not necessary but may 
occur.  Under big data theories of identity management, an aggregation of 
data can, for instance, map identity—such as classification of potential 
terrorist status.  In addition, the same vetting and screening protocols 
facilitate determinations as to access (e.g., whether an individual can board a 
plane or enter the country).  It is the accumulation and analysis of the ever-
growing aggregation of data that makes possible the database screening and 
algorithmic decision-making that is at the core of the extreme vetting 
enterprise. 
New classification and screening technologies thus eliminate or reduce the 
need to conduct human-based screening.  Historic Jim Crow laws required 
bus drivers to segregate passengers on the basis of race, a screening protocol 
that required human judgment and human action.183  Contemporary systems 
may use a combination of automated screening and human screening, such 
as TSA screeners relying upon the predictive analytic systems of the No Fly 
List.184  Algorithmic Jim Crow may also facilitate fully automated and 
digitized screening systems.185 
Under contemporary forms of big data governance, classification will 
likely comprise a combination of traditional characteristics such as well-
recognized protected classifications (e.g., race, national origin, gender, and 
age) as well as nonprotected attributes (e.g., data deemed suspicious, unstable 
or anomalous digital data, and database screening and algorithmically 
derived results) that allow for inferences of guilt.  But instead of 
impermissibly distributing or withholding privileges based on protected 
classifications, big data will simply incorporate them as part of a “risk 
assessment.”  Such threat risk assessments will attempt to predict criminal or 
terroristic predisposition.186  Unlike historic Jim Crow, Algorithmic Jim 
Crow may not require classification in order to conduct screening.  Because 
of the vast amounts of digital data that can be analyzed for both classification 
and screening purposes, data will, at times, be collected and sorted for 
classification to screen.187  At other times, data will be collected and screened 
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to determine a classification.  Thus, big data governance facilitates screening 
and classification, or classification and screening, through big data systems 
such as database screening, digital watchlisting, and security analytics. 
Extreme vetting, as proposed in the March 6, 2017, Order and the 
September 24, 2017, Order—and as promulgated by other immigrant 
screening systems—is used in this Article as a mere example for how 
Algorithmic Jim Crow regimes can potentially burrow into national security 
policy-making.  Directives such as the presidential Executive Order188 can 
create classification and screening systems under law, regulation, and 
policy.189  To understand how, it is important to dissect the manner in which 
extreme vetting and other DHS algorithmically driven programs are likely to 
classify and screen citizens and noncitizens. 
Yet, a full explanation of how algorithmic classification and screening 
systems work, and the problems presented by big data and predictive 
analytics, is beyond the scope of this Article.190  There has been much 
important work and attention addressing the broader topic, as well as the 
issue of discrimination resulting from the use of these emerging 
technologies.191  Predictive analytics make actionable or useful information 
from data by using algorithms and other machine-learning techniques.192  
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While algorithms and other machine-learning technologies can make 
meaningful connections from large sets of data that are outside any human 
capabilities, researchers and experts are increasingly noting their limitations:  
artificial intelligence systems are not immune to inherent racial biases, and 
thus judgments derived from algorithms may also be suspect.193 
III.  THEORETICAL EQUALITY UNDER ALGORITHMIC JIM CROW 
Part III explores how modern vetting protocol is properly understood as 
part of a web of identity-management technologies that may extend to the 
entire citizenry.  For example, although extreme vetting is presented as a 
procedure that is restricted to refugees, immigrants, and foreign visitors 
seeking a travel visa to the United States, this characterization is misleading.  
Extreme vetting is better grasped as a function of database screening and 
digital watchlisting systems that can be applied equally to all citizens and 
noncitizens under a wide range of contexts, often justified by national and 
homeland security policy rationales. 
A.  Limitations of Equal Protection as 
a Legal Response to Algorithmic Jim Crow 
Before they are allowed to fly, work, drive, or vote, citizens and 
noncitizens alike can now be subjected to mass data collection and automated 
or semiautomated database screening protocols.194  Increasingly, in the name 
of national and homeland security, post-9/11 big data programs implemented 
by the government allow for core rights and freedoms to be partially 
obstructed in some instances or altogether blocked in others.195  Moreover, 
because of the “virtual” nature of mass data collection and database screening 
and the classified nature of certain programs, the digital mediation and 
potential interference of liberty interests can occur without our knowledge or 
consent.196 
As the national population is increasingly represented in the growing 
databases and becomes subject to potential across-the-board vetting and 
screening, claims of equal protection violations may collapse.  This 
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likelihood increases as defenders of database screening argue such screening 
minimizes the role of the human element and thus minimizes the risk of racial 
profiling on a theoretical level.  Because the algorithms of any given big data 
vetting or database screening system will not be transparent to those subject 
to screening, the denial of a benefit or privilege, or consequences such as 
detainment and deportation, will be without apparent cause beyond the fact 
that the database has determined that they should be targeted.197 
Thus, Algorithmic Jim Crow demonstrates how Jim Crow regimes can 
adapt and evolve through use of modern technology.  In Michelle 
Alexander’s seminal work, The New Jim Crow:  Mass Incarceration in the 
Age of Colorblindness,198 the story of Jim Crow has transformed from one of 
mass segregation and disenfranchisement regimes in the post-Reconstruction 
era into mass incarceration regimes in the post-War on Drugs199 and the era 
of mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines.200  Alexander posits that Jim 
Crow should be evaluated as a constantly evolving process, not a historical 
artifact.201  Redressing new forms of Jim Crow requires observing 
innovations in law and policy that result in the entrenchment of inequities on 
the basis of race and other sites of historic discrimination.202  As such, 
Alexander warns that vigilance is needed to bear witness to an evolutionary 
process of law and policy that can lead to new caste systems.203  This is 
especially true in a modern era that may present the mechanism for the caste 
as colorblind,204 and involve data tracking and digital sorting methods that 
may present a “virtual” cage problem.205 
Taking a cue from Alexander to refuse to limit Jim Crow to regimes 
designed to subordinate a single race or class of individuals, we may see the 
newest emergence of Jim Crow in mass surveillance and algorithm-driven 
decision-making.  Database screening and digital watchlisting systems, in 
fact, can serve as complementary and facially colorblind supplements to mass 
incarceration systems.206  The purported colorblindness of mandatory 
sentencing and mass incarceration systems, for instance, parallels the 
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purported colorblindness of mandatory database screening and vetting 
systems. 
As Reva Siegel has theorized, anticlassification jurisprudence cannot 
achieve the same aims as antisubordination or antibalkinization 
jurisprudence.207  In contemporary equality cases considered before the 
Supreme Court, Siegel observes:  “The Justices who vote against affirmative 
action and other race-conscious civil rights policies are said to reason from a 
colorblind anticlassification principle, premised on the belief that the 
Constitution protects individuals, not groups, and so bars all racial 
classifications, except as a remedy for specific wrongdoing.”208  This judicial 
predisposition to overturn programs that redress wrongs for suspect 
classifications—even when the clear purpose of such programs is to assist 
those historically harmed by such classifications—means that vetting and 
screening protocols that do not overtly target such suspect classifications will 
not present an equal protection problem.  In other words, if the 
“anticlassification principle” continues to dominate equal protection 
jurisprudence, “race-neutral” and equally applied database screening and 
digital watchlisting systems will not appear to be inconsistent with the 
anticlassification premise of equality law.  Therefore, such programs may 
pass equal protection muster, even if they impose disparate consequences.209 
Similarly, Jack Balkin provocatively asserts that the law of equality is 
often, in fact, the law of inequality.210  Balkin argues that, historically and 
paradoxically, the law of equality has been adaptive to enforce inequality.211  
Balkin explains that the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson acknowledged 
that a multitude of social and economic inequities arise on the basis of 
race.212  Nonetheless, Plessy ratified racial segregation after finding no equal 
protection defect with Jim Crow institutions.213  The Court concluded that 
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the “separate but equal” principle upheld the equality guarantees required 
under the Equal Protection Clause so long as the government provided a form 
of theoretical equality on the back end of segregation.214  According to 
Plessy, the separation of the races on the front end of state laws did not create 
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause because the discrimination could 
be redressed on the back end.215  The Plessy Court further concluded that 
racial separation on the front end could serve important law-and-order goals, 
such as increasing a state’s interest in ensuring safety and social order among 
the different races.216 
This legal reasoning is now widely discredited and, as noted, the Court 
now has an antidiscrimination approach that strictly scrutinizes laws that 
operate along such suspect classifications.217  Nevertheless, that approach too 
is viewed as inadequate by constitutional law experts and as hindering efforts 
to address unequal realities.  In contrast to the theoretical equality guarantees 
assured on the back end of sorting methods instituted under historic Jim Crow 
regimes, at the dawn of the big data revolution we may be witnessing more 
and more legal contexts in which all are equally subject to digitalized vetting 
and database screening protocols but with results on the back end that raise 
equal protection concerns.  Equality law that demands that the government 
provide equal treatment under the law on a theoretical level on the front end 
therefore prohibits traditional Jim Crow institutions.  But Siegel, Balkin, and 
others caution that equality law cannot stop at a judicial inquiry that ensures 
colorblindness on the front end since that risks turning a blind eye to the 
disparate impacts that can result on the back end.218 
As the government continues to acquire more big data tools to serve 
governance goals, such as database screening systems and predictive 
analytics that assess risk, equality law may find no constitutional problem 
with replication in reverse form of the social inequality permitted under the 
“separate but equal” principle.  Under an emerging technologically enhanced 
Jim Crow regime, mass surveillance and semiautomated or automated 
algorithmic sorting methods will appear to be equally applied across entire 
populations.  The colorblind and anticlassification premises of vetting and 
screening systems will comport with an “equal but separate” principle.  These 
systems, however, will potentially offer only theoretical equality on the front 
end of newly emerging data surveillance and data-sorting methods.  
Meanwhile, any disparate impacts on the back end will be hard to challenge 
judicially because algorithmic decision-making can occur in ways that are 
difficult to document. 
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The evolution of constitutional protections is, thus, critically necessary in 
what Balkin and Sanford Levinson term the “National Surveillance State.”219  
In the National Surveillance State, the integration of bureaucratized and 
normalized data collection and Information Society surveillance technologies 
into day-to-day governance should be understood as a distinctive concern of 
American constitutionalism:  “One of the most important developments in 
American constitutionalism is the gradual transformation of the United States 
into a National Surveillance State.”220  Constitutional protections that once 
were taken for granted in a small data world have proven robust in theory but 
lacking in practical application.221  Often, it is not so much that our physical 
personhood is threatened in the National Surveillance State, but as Daniel 
Solove describes it, it is our “digital person” that has been placed at risk.222 
The shift to the National Surveillance State and big data governance should 
be understood as paradigmatic.  Big data and algorithmic intelligence 
technologies are disruptive and transformative in nature.223  Defined by their 
predictive and correlative capacities, big data technologies are capable of 
facilitating a new type of knowledge that some argue is akin to virtual reality 
(e.g., probabilistic or algorithmic holograms).224 
Thus, big data surveillance that transforms into normalized day-to-day 
governance practices often poses harms that are more virtual than physical— 
for instance, digitally derived suspicion harms rather than detention harms.225  
As a result, big data-driven predictive-policing methods are void of 
reasonable suspicion as once defined in a small data world.226  For example, 
while in a small data world, reasonable suspicion is based on specific facts 
or inferences regarding a specific individual’s involvement in criminal 
activity.  In a big data world, on the other hand, targeting of suspects can 
proceed based on data that is associated with them as collected in a database 
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and that fit particular profiles targeted by database searches.  Small data 
discrimination, consequently, can evolve into a form of big data 
discrimination in a myriad of ways.  For example, statistical guilt or 
correlative evidence that support inferences of suspicion can be assigned 
through “race-neutral” tools that screen entire populations “equally.” 
B.  No Fly List and Discrimination on the Back End of Vetting 
and Database Screening Protocols 
To further understand how Algorithmic Jim Crow works in practice in 
across-the-board vetting, this Part examines the No Fly List, the birth of a 
“precrime”227 vetting system that screens citizens and noncitizens in a 
purportedly equal manner on the front end.  De facto discrimination, for 
instance, has been alleged in the disparate impact of the No Fly List, a system 
that has been referred to as a “Flying While Muslim” program.228 
Although discrimination may not occur on the front end of the vetting and 
screening process of the No Fly List, plaintiffs challenging the No Fly List 
allege that the program results in disparate consequences that 
disproportionately impact those populations associated with terrorism, such 
as military-age Muslim males229 or Muslims who may be swept into the No 
Fly List database screening systems by virtue of intensified surveillance of 
Muslim communities by the intelligence community.230  Examining the No 
Fly List litigation shows that, in the absence of discrimination in front-end 
enforcement techniques, back-end discrimination can emerge from the 
supposedly neutral analytics of the digital watchlisting and database 
screening system itself. 
The No Fly List as well as other vetting and screening systems have 
already faced multiple legal challenges.  Federal courts have been asked to 
address the new types of harms presented by digital watchlisting and database 
screening in the National Surveillance State.231  Of the challenges to multiple 
identity-management technologies that have reached the Supreme Court, 
none have allowed for an equal protection claim.  As Cass Sunstein explains, 
“[t]he Equal Protection Clause is directed at the legality of classifications.  
When a classification is challenged, the first question is whether it is drawn 
on the basis of race or some other characteristic thought to call for 
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‘heightened’ scrutiny.”232  If there is an impermissible classification, that 
statute must survive the appropriate level of scrutiny.  If there is no 
classification, Sunstein explains, the inquiry proceeds to a second question: 
Was the classification motivated by an ‘intention’ to treat some class 
differently on the basis of race or, again, any other characteristic said to call 
for heightened scrutiny?  If the answer is affirmative, heightened scrutiny 
must be applied; if negative, the statute must be upheld unless it is not 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.233 
Under the vetting and screening protocols of the No Fly List, there is no 
classification or characteristic that warrants “heightened” scrutiny.  Further, 
thus far, there is no evidence that the vetting and database screening protocol 
is motivated by an “intention” to discriminate on the basis of an 
impermissible classification.  Because equal protection is not a viable option 
to challenge the No Fly List—as the screening is applied in a purportedly 
equal manner—the use or misuse of data-driven tools has been central to the 
inquiry in the federal courts. 
Specifically, No Fly List litigation has been primarily successful through 
procedural due process claims, though many plaintiffs also originally raised 
substantive due process claims.234  The due process challenge to the No Fly 
List is relevant here because that challenge attacks the workings of the vetting 
and screening processes, and, importantly, how identity-management 
technology can lead to stigmatization and reputational harms, allegedly on 
the basis of classification.  For the purposes of this discussion, therefore, it is 
helpful to concurrently examine the due process analysis of two similar No 
Fly List cases, though acknowledgeable differences exist between them. 
In both Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Security235 and Latif v. 
Holder,236 federal courts analyzed due process claims that the plaintiffs’ 
rights to travel were infringed upon by their inclusion on the No Fly List.  In 
Latif, the plaintiffs argued that the No Fly List burdens a protected liberty 
interest237 without due process of law:  namely, that their placement on the 
No Fly List burdened their liberty interests in the freedom of travel,238 and 
freedom from the false stigmatization and association with terrorists and 
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terroristic activities implicit in inclusion on the No Fly List.239  Similarly, the 
plaintiff in Ibrahim alleged deprivations of her liberty and property interests 
without due process of law.240 
Once a protected liberty interest in either the travel or reputational interest 
was established, in each case, the plaintiffs were required to satisfy the three-
part due process test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge.241  Under Mathews, 
the court weighs:  (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”242 
For example, under the first Mathews factor in Latif, the plaintiffs 
contended that protected liberty interests reside in freedom of travel and 
movement, and in reputational concerns.243  Under the second factor, the 
plaintiffs argued that the redress procedure inherently risks an unacceptably 
high error rate because it does not allow plaintiffs, or other individuals placed 
on the No Fly List, the opportunity to confront or rebut any evidence used in 
determining the appropriateness of their placement on the list.244  In other 
words, the vetting and screening protocol of the No Fly List allowed for 
discrimination on the back end in that those singled out as potential threats 
had no meaningful redress.  Finally, regarding the third factor, although 
national security is a significant government interest, the procedural 
protections provided to plaintiffs were insufficient given the lack of notice 
and “wholly ineffective” procedures of the protocol.245 
The No Fly List due process challenges are necessary to challenge back-
end discrimination because there is no other way to interrogate the 
classification mechanism used to assess threat risk or what data might be 
deemed suspicious.  In other words, there may be alleged commonalities 
among those finding themselves on the No Fly List, such as being Muslim 
American, Arab American, a citizen of a Muslim-majority country, or of 
Middle Eastern descent.  Because the government argues that the No Fly List 
involves classified information—including database screening systems and 
vetting protocols that make “predictive judgments”—there is no meaningful 
way to interrogate how and why that characteristic predominates among 
those selected by the algorithm or digital watchlisting technology.246 
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The closest plaintiffs on the No Fly List have come to determining whether 
and how they faced classification-based discrimination is through a 
deconstruction of the digital watchlisting architecture and an analysis of the 
databases that may be implicated in the vetting and screening protocols.247  
The complaints and trial records appear to suggest that the No Fly List results 
in a disparate impact.248  The algorithms and databases present themselves as 
neutral, without bias.  Thus, due process protection allows for some 
interrogation of the vetting and database screening systems and its errors.   
Human error can become unimpeachable truth but for legal challenges.  
Database error risks a form of unimpeachable truth without a legal theory to 
challenge it.  What are the reasons for being wrongly placed on the No Fly 
List?  How does one prove discriminatory animus in vetting and screening 
protocols?  How does one establish algorithm-derived discrimination?  The 
No Fly List litigation shows that equal protection as a theory fails to shield 
those suffering disparate treatment or de facto back-end discrimination under 
the current framework for evaluating Fourteenth Amendment claims. 
As in Plessy, Algorithmic Jim Crow may offer theoretical equality that 
may thwart challenges under the Equal Protection Clause.  As in Korematsu, 
governmental action taken purportedly in defense of national security may 
be viewed as legitimately containing risk and may not be construed as 
targeting individuals on the basis of classification.  Plessy and Korematsu 
represent two discredited cases that are now considered a part of what 
Richard Primus and other scholars refer to as the “anti-canon” of 
constitutional law.249  Just as those challenging the constitutionality of 
historic Jim Crow regimes in Plessy and Japanese internment in Korematsu 
were unsuccessful, those challenging Algorithmic Jim Crow regimes may 
face similar difficulties due to similar deficiencies in current jurisprudence. 
IV.  FUTURE OF ALGORITHMIC JIM CROW 
To further illustrate how screening and vetting protocols can be extended 
to the entire citizenry, Part IV examines how the Supreme Court has handled 
challenges to multiple identity-management programs in recent years.  
Parties in several cases are attempting to seek judicial review of government 
identity-management programs and dataveillance technologies, programs 
that are rapidly flourishing in both scope and number.  The Supreme Court 
has now had the opportunity to review multiple identity-management 
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systems in NASA v. Nelson,250 Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,251 and 
Arizona v. United States.252  In each of these cases, however, the equal 
protection consequences of the vetting protocols were not before the Supreme 
Court. 
A.  Biometric Credentialing and 
Vetting Protocols:  NASA v. Nelson 
Nelson253 involved a challenge to aspects of Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 12:  Policy for a Common Identification Standard for 
Federal Employees and Contractors (the “HSPD-12” program)254 in an effort 
to limit the impact of this identity-management program on personal privacy 
rights.255  HSPD-12 is a post-9/11 presidential directive promulgated by the 
Bush administration to implement a biometric ID-credentialing and 
background-check program for federal employees and federal contractors.  
HSPD-12 and the litigation surrounding Nelson provide an opportunity to 
examine the impact of identity-management technologies.  It explores some 
future implications of these technologies, including the possibility of 
morality testing in civilian background tests, which was originally at issue in 
the case. 
Exploring the impact of such identity-management technologies, including 
the possibility of morality testing, is also important given the stated purposes 
for extreme vetting procedures set forth in President Trump’s Executive 
Orders on immigration.  The January 27, 2017, Order specifically states that 
its purpose is to include an assessment of the ideological and constitutional 
posture of immigrants through extreme vetting: 
In order to protect Americans, the United States must ensure that those 
admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes toward it and its 
founding principles.  The United States cannot, and should not, admit those 
who do not support the Constitution, or those who would place violent 
ideologies over American law.256 
Although the March 6, 2017, Order does not include this language, the 
screening and vetting requirements set forth in section 5 are more expansive 
and ambiguous.  For instance, instead of focusing on constitutional ideology, 
section 5 casts a wide precrime net, stating that the screening and vetting 
standards will analyze, for example, the “risk of causing harm.”257   
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The September 24, 2017, Order increases the ambiguity of the screening 
and vetting mandate even further.  In section 1(a) of the September 24, 2017, 
Order, it states that the purpose and policy of the Proclamation is “to protect 
its citizens from terrorist attacks and other public-safety threats.  Screening 
and vetting protocols and procedures associated with visa adjudications and 
other immigration processes play a critical role in implementing that 
policy.”258 
The September 24, 2017, Order does not define how threat risks will be 
assessed, nor does it provide specific details on the “[s]creening and vetting 
protocols and procedures” that are prescribed.  However, in several sections, 
including sections 1(b), 1(c)(i), and 1(d), the Order refers to the need to 
implement “identity-management and information-sharing protocols and 
procedures.”259  The opacity of these “protocols and procedures” 
reemphasizes the ambiguity of the precrime mandate suggested by the 
Orders.  Nelson, therefore, is particularly relevant to understanding the 
ambition of the Orders, as the HSPD-12 program that was challenged in 
Nelson was intended to help implement “identity-management and 
information-sharing protocols and procedures” after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. 
In Nelson, NASA contractors argued that the background check required 
by the HSPD-12 program violated a constitutional right to informational 
privacy.  The Court ruled against the NASA contractors, holding that the 
background-check process that was challenged consisted of “reasonable, 
employment-related inquiries that further the Government’s interests in 
managing its internal operations.”260 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Nelson was widely anticipated by privacy 
experts and scholars.  Over three decades have passed since the Court 
“referred broadly to a constitutional privacy ‘interest in avoiding disclosure 
of personal matters.’”261  When the Court granted certiorari, therefore, some 
were hopeful that Nelson presented a ripe opportunity to reaffirm the role of 
a constitutional right to information privacy in safeguarding private 
individuals—here, privately employed scientist-contractors performing low-
security-risk research for NASA through a private university—from 
unnecessarily overbroad disclosure requirements by the government and the 
risks of inadvertent or malicious exposure of personal information that could 
result from the government’s digitalized data collection procedures.  As one 
amicus brief filed in the case explained, “Constitutional privacy safeguards 
are particularly important in this case because NASA’s failure to meet its 
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obligations under the Privacy Act and the agency’s poor data security 
practices pose substantial risks to the scientists’ personal information.”262 
Given the significance of the case, especially in light of increasing public 
concerns about suspicionless data mining by the government and recent well-
publicized cases of database compromise through hackers, some were 
surprised when the Court issued its decision rather quickly and summarily, 
fairly soon after oral argument.  In a relatively brief opinion, the Supreme 
Court “assume[d], without deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy 
right.”263  The Court then concluded that NASA’s background check, newly 
implemented to bring the federal agency into compliance with HSPD-12, did 
not violate a right to privacy, if one were to assume that such a right might 
exist.264  The Court held that “[t]he Government’s interests as employer and 
proprietor in managing its internal operations, combined with the protections 
against public dissemination provided by the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a (2006 ed. and Supp. IV), satisfy any ‘interest in avoiding disclosure’ 
that may ‘arguably ha[ve] its roots in the Constitution.’”265 
With its decision, the Supreme Court overturned a preliminary injunction 
that had ordered the suspension of NASA’s background-check process after 
the Ninth Circuit found aspects of the government’s questions to be in 
violation of the scientists’ constitutional right to privacy.266  The Supreme 
Court explained that the Ninth Circuit was in error because “[t]he questions 
challenged by respondents are part of a standard employment background 
check of the sort used by millions of private employers.”267  Yet, the 
significance of this case is misstated and misunderstood when cast as a 
simplistic battle over background-check protocol under the government’s 
HSPD-12 program and whether that protocol may or may not implicate 
constitutional privacy interests. 
Both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit focused on a series of drug-
related questions presumed to be the most objectionable to the scientists and 
that are listed on the Standard Form 85:  Questionnaire for Non-Sensitive 
Positions (“SF 85”).268  SF 85 asks whether an employee has “used, 
possessed, supplied, or manufactured illegal drugs” in the last year.269  In 
issuing the preliminary injunction, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
form’s “‘open-ended and highly private’ questions . . . were not ‘narrowly 
tailored’ to meet the Government’s interests in verifying contractors’ 
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identities and ‘ensuring the security” of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at 
NASA.270 
In a footnote, the Court noted a compelling question raised by the scientists 
that had been dismissed by the Ninth Circuit as unripe and had not been made 
the subject of a cross-petition:  a question of the so-called “suitability” criteria 
that the government used to determine employment eligibility at Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory.271  These factors include consideration of a 
candidate’s financial and emotional health as well as things like “carnal 
knowledge.”272  The “suitability” criteria were derived from a ninety-four-
page government vetting protocol document titled, “NASA Desk Guide for 
Suitability and Security Clearance Processing, Version 2.”273 
Specifically, understanding the scientists’ constitutional informational 
privacy claim requires an understanding of the morality- and character-
testing criteria that were open for questioning and evaluation during the 
background-check process required under NASA’s implementation of 
HSPD-12.  On page sixty-five of the desk guide, NASA includes an “Issue 
Characterization Chart” that allows NASA to assess individuals’ character 
and “suitability” based on more than 100 itemized characteristics.274  These 
items appeared to assess good moral character and trustworthiness.  
Characteristics on the evaluation include:  “[d]runk”; “[b]ad check”; 
“[p]attern of irresponsibility as reflected in credit history”; “[c]arnal 
knowledge”; “indecent proposal”; “sodomy”; “voyeurism [or] peeping tom”; 
“[m]ailing, selling, or displaying obscene material”; “[b]eastiality”; 
“[p]attern of excessive [substance abuse] as reflected in inability to function 
responsibly [and] medical treatment or poor health”; “[d]isorderly conduct”; 
“[a]ttitude [and] [p]ersonality [c]onflict”; “[t]respassing”; and “[m]inor 
traffic violation.”275 
Upon successful completion of the NASA “Suitability and Security 
Clearance Processing” protocol, the desk guide authorizes the agency to issue 
the NASA employee or private contractor a biometric ID card in accordance 
with HSPD-12.276  Failure to pass this newly implemented clearance process 
results in the termination of employment.277  While the “suitability” criteria 
were not before the Court, the acting solicitor general nevertheless felt 
compelled to assert at oral argument that “NASA will not and does not use” 
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such objectionable criteria “to make contractor credentialing decisions.”278  
The need for such assurance indicates the scientists did indeed have real 
privacy concerns, even if they did not crystallize into part of a live claim 
before the Court. 
Thus, lost in this case was a real concern about what information NASA, 
or any other government agency, is allowed to seek under the identity-
verification procedures imposed by HSPD-12 and whether the constitution, 
under a privacy right, imposes any fundamental limiting principles on that 
identity-verification process.  The acting solicitor general’s assurance that 
intimate personal details regarding credit card debt and carnal knowledge, for 
example, will not be considered by NASA is nothing more than that—just an 
assurance.  Meanwhile the “suitability” criteria that could be used to 
determine the denial of the issuance of a biometric ID card under HSPD-12 
makes clear that fears that government identity-management programs may 
become overbroad and overintrusive are not paranoid or baseless. 
Nelson, by affirming HSPD-12, may now pave the way for the 
implementation of a biometric credentialing program and uniform biometric-
based dataveillance program on a national scale.  Nelson also demonstrates 
how suitable character testing or morality testing can be built into modern 
vetting protocols in civilian background checks, as the facts of the case 
demonstrated that NASA employees and contractors were required to 
demonstrate trustworthiness and good character before receipt of the 
biometric identification card. 
Under a universal biometric identification system, however, suitability 
testing or character-vetting protocols could be embedded within the database 
screening system itself.  Thus, the morality testing would not necessarily 
arrive at the front end of the vetting process, as was seen in Nelson.  Rather, 
the accumulation of biometric and biographic data enables both biometric 
and suitability testing.  Rather than clearing a suitability assessment in order 
to qualify for a biometric ID card, a biometric-anchored database screening 
system could allow for moral- and suitability-criteria testing on the back end 
of the vetting process.  Recent disclosures by Edward Snowden, for example, 
explain how biometric data can be fused with biographic data to assess 
risk.279 
This development in Supreme Court jurisprudence is, thus, significant 
because the original announcement of Trump’s “Muslim Ban” indicated that 
the proposal was inclusive of U.S. citizens.  Specifically, on December 8, 
2015, shortly after then-candidate Trump announced plans for the Muslim 
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travel ban, he suggested in a nationally televised interview280 that the ban 
could possibly extend to Muslim Americans.281  Trump invoked former 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s World War II proclamation that U.S. 
citizens who were potentially “enemy aliens” could be detained.282 
On January 28, 2017, one day after President Trump signed the Executive 
Order imposing restrictions on the travel and immigration of citizens of 
Muslim-majority nations, Fox News asked former New York City Mayor 
Rudy Giuliani whether the Executive Order was, in fact, a Muslim ban.283  
Guiliani explained:  “[W]hen [Trump] first announced it [during the 
campaign], he said, ‘Muslim ban.’  He called me up.  He said, ‘Put a 
commission together.  Show me the right way to do it legally.’”284  Giuliani 
elaborated further:  “And what we did was, we focused on, instead of religion, 
danger . . . .  Perfectly legal, perfectly sensible.  And that’s what the ban is 
based on.  It’s not based on religion.  It’s based on places where there are 
[sic] substantial evidence that people are sending terrorists into our 
country.”285  This suggests that discriminatory vetting and screening 
protocols can evade judicial review if a protected class is targeted indirectly 
through “race-neutral” criteria, such as threat risk assessments. 
In Washington v. Trump,286 litigation that addressed the first Executive 
Order, the Ninth Circuit disagreed that the government had established 
sufficient evidence of an impending national security threat.287  On February 
9, 2017, in upholding the Western District of Washington’s grant of a 
temporary restraining order, halting the implementation of the Executive 
Order, the Ninth Circuit concluded:  “[T]he Government has not offered any 
evidence or even an explanation of how the national security concerns that 
justified those designations [of travel and immigration restrictions], which 
triggered visa requirements, can be extrapolated to justify an urgent need for 
the Executive Order to be immediately reinstated.”288 
In subsequent litigation, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits agreed that the 
Government had failed to show a sufficient justification for the Executive 
Order.  In Hawaii v. Trump,289 the Ninth Circuit panel explained that the 
president had not made a “sufficient finding . . . that entry of the excluded 
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classes would be detrimental to . . . the United States.”290  In International 
Refugee Assistance Project, the Fourth Circuit noted that while the 
government argued that it had a national security purpose in issuing the 
Order, evidence supporting such a purpose was “comparably weak[er]” than 
then-candidate Trump’s statements about a Muslim ban, subsequent 
statements on the issues, statements made by his advisors, as well as the 
issuance of and statements made by President Trump and his advisors 
regarding the second Executive Order.291  At the time this Article was 
written, the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in both cases and 
consolidated them for argument.292 
On February 24, 2017, the Associated Press reported that a leaked memo 
drafted at the request of the DHS acting Under Secretary for Intelligence and 
Analysis concluded “citizenship is an unlikely indicator of terrorism threats 
to the United States.”293  The memo states that the analysis undertaken by 
DHS specifically analyzed the threat of the “seven countries [that were] 
impacted by [section 3 of Executive Order] 13769.”294  The DHS memo 
states that “of [eighty-two] people the government determined were inspired 
by a foreign terrorist group to carry out or try to carry out an attack in the 
United States [since the Syrian conflict commenced in March 2011], just over 
half were U.S. citizens born in the United States.”295  The DHS memo further 
states that the terrorists were from “[twenty-six] countries, led by Pakistan, 
Somalia, Bangladesh, Cuba, Ethiopia, Iraq and Uzbekistan.  Of these, only 
Somalia and Iraq were among the seven nations included in the ban.”296  Both 
the Ninth and Fourth Circuits discussed this memorandum and relied on it in 
their rulings.297 
Importantly, the original January 27, 2017, Order states that vetting policy 
should include a test to assess fidelity to founding principles and the 
Constitution.298  Statements by Trump suggest that such vetting should 
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include a test to assess loyalty to the United States and whether an individual 
will “support our country, and love deeply our people.”299  He further 
promoted, as a candidate, the implementation of profiling and preventative 
measures, such as mass surveillance, to assess terroristic risk.300 
In Nelson, twin innovations in national security policy and biometric 
surveillance policy included a machine-readable biometric ID card encoded 
with digitalized biometric data and other personally identifiable data, as was 
required by the HSPD-12 program.  In the suitability criteria developed by 
NASA, a version of extreme vetting emerged.  The January 27, 2017, Order 
discusses the need to implement loyalty tests that demonstrate “pro-
American” values.  Thus, extreme vetting may be expanded to encompass 
similar abstract assessments of character and morality as a part of threat risk 
assessments. 
By affirming the credentialing protocol surrounding HSPD-12 and 
sanctioning an identity-management technology, Nelson opens the door to 
profound questions of constitutional law, electronic privacy law and policy, 
and surveillance policy that have yet to be resolved.  These questions include 
the role of biometric technology and dataveillance in national security policy 
and immigration-control policy.  It now remains to be seen whether HSPD-12 
will eventually serve as a programmatic and technological prototype for a 
national biometric ID system, such as a biometric social security card or 
biometric ePassport, in the future. 
B.  Delegating Vetting and Database Screening Protocols 
to States and Private Entities 
In addition to de facto discrimination, Algorithmic Jim Crow regimes can 
promote de jure discrimination or discrimination as a matter of law.301  Under 
historic Jim Crow regimes, enforcement of segregationist laws was delegated 
to both public and private entities.302  Those who participated in segregation 
gatekeeping often did so under the threat of legally imposed sanctions.303 
Resistance to the mandate to segregate train service, for instance, led to the 
initiation of a legal challenge to Louisiana’s Jim Crow laws in Plessy, which 
required the cooperation of railway companies that were frustrated with their 
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gatekeeping duties under the Separate Car Act.304  Railway companies 
opposed the segregation law on the ground that running two train cars—one 
for white passengers and one for black passengers—was economically costly, 
especially for train routes on which ridership had proven to be light.305  The 
petitioners also argued that it was unlawful to delegate segregationist 
gatekeeping to the private companies who would be fined for allowing black 
passengers to ride white railcars.306  Homer Adolph Plessy had been selected 
to violate the Jim Crow law specifically because he was a light-skinned black 
man who could “pass” as a white man.307 
Yet, a similar de jure discrimination scheme may be emerging in the 
modern era.  How do private and state immigration gatekeepers determine 
whether an individual is lawfully present in the United States?  Under the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA),308 the federal 
government delegated immigration enforcement authority to all employers, 
public and private, to assist in immigration gatekeeping duties through the 
examination of paper-based documents that purport to establish identity and 
citizenship status.309  Under IRCA, employers faced civil and criminal fines 
for failure to participate in sorting out undocumented immigrants from the 
workforce.310 
In 1990, the Wall Street Journal editorial pages compared federal 
employer-sanctioning policies required under federal immigration law to 
historic Jim Crow regimes.  The publication explained that private entities 
were once again asked to engage in discrimination311 under the law by 
effectually being deputized as immigration gatekeepers.  Specifically, the 
Wall Street Journal described IRCA as “the first legislation since Jim Crow 
where the government is so closely aligned with a process that produces 
discrimination.”312 
From the 1970s to the present, immigration laws at the federal and state 
level have attempted to restrict immigrant access to transportation and travel, 
employment, education, housing, and benefits.313  In contrast to historic Jim 
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Crow regimes, however, the targeting of the undocumented immigrant 
population does not need to proceed under a façade of “equality” because 
such discrimination is often construed as legally permissible.  Undocumented 
immigrants, with important exceptions, do not enjoy the broad civil rights 
protections and constitutional rights afforded to U.S. citizens.314  Even lawful 
immigrants may face more restricted rights than U.S. citizens.315  Those 
arguing in favor of tough immigration actions, including those defending the 
Executive Orders, have explained this position as a legal defense of such 
actions.316 
Yet, for decades, lawful immigrants and those perceived to be foreign have 
alleged that they suffer from a form of collateral discrimination:  an 
assumption of undocumented status and accidental targeting that stems from 
restrictive immigration laws.317  Studies have consistently shown that vetting 
and screening protocols required by immigration gatekeeping—sometimes 
referred to as “show me your papers” laws—incentivize racial profiling.318  
In other words, mandatory document checks often target those perceived to 
be foreign:  those who may be isolated on the basis of race, color, ethnicity, 
national origin, religion, and “foreignness” characteristics,319 such as accent, 
clothing, and a failure to present “whiteness” characteristics.320 
In response to growing empirical evidence that immigration-related 
screening and delegated gatekeeping duties by the government reliably led to 
discrimination, Congress increasingly looked to technological screening 
methods as “race-neutral” tools to achieve the same means.321  Throughout 
the 1990s until the present, immigration reform legislation has proposed 
database-driven methods to implement screening and gatekeeping 
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functions.322  Many of these database screening methods are experimental 
and still under testing.323 
Nonetheless, the 9/11 terror attacks accelerated the rollout of these 
experimental vetting and screening systems.324  The immigrant status of the 
9/11 hijackers led to calls for policy initiatives that could facilitate the 
identification and more efficient tracking of immigrants and potential 
terrorists through cybersurveillance and dataveillance technologies.325  Many 
of these technologies were dependent upon biometric data monitoring and 
database-facilitated algorithmic sorting tools.326  The impetus was not so 
much to avoid bias in screening but to harness the supposed efficiencies and 
reliability of a database-centered means of screening. 
Since 9/11, immigration policy and national security policy have 
increasingly converged.  At the federal level, this convergence could be seen 
in the increasing adoption of big data identity-management systems aimed to 
screen the population to determine who could receive rights and benefits, 
such as the No Fly List,327 the No Work List (“E-Verify”),328 and the No 
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9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 385–92 (2004), http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/ 
911Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RT32-JKEZ] (“Linking biometric passports to good data 
systems and decision-making is a fundamental goal.”). 
 326. See SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION:  THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 37–67 (2000); KELLY A. GATES, OUR BIOMETRIC FUTURE:  FACIAL RECOGNITION 
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automated facial recognition system may have helped avert the September 11 terrorist attacks 
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in the aftermath of the catastrophe.”); ANIL K. JAIN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO BIOMETRICS vii 
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two decades in both public and private sectors.  These developments have been fueled in part 
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TO DNA:  BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION IN U.S. IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AND BEYOND 
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Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407 (2012); Hu, supra note 
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 327. 49 U.S.C. § 44903 (2012); 49 C.F.R. pts. 1540, 1544, 1560 (2016). 
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http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/nativedocuments/E-Verify_Manual.pdf 
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Citizenship List (managed by Secure Communities329 and the DHS’s 
Prioritized Enforcement Program330).  These database screening and digital 
watchlisting systems purport to further crime control, immigration control, 
and counterterrorism objectives.  The E-Verify database has not only been 
used to restrict employment opportunities, but it is alleged that landlords have 
used the database to screen tenants and that school officials have used the 
database to screen students.331  Similarly, the No Vote List (“SAVE”332 and 
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Jeh Johnson on November 20, 2014, to replace the S-COMM program; however, it appears 
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Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. 
Winkowski, Acting Director, Immigr. & Customs Enf’t 2 (Nov. 20, 2014), 
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[https://perma.cc/SCL3-Z7YX].  On February 20, 2017, former DHS Secretary John Kelly 
signed an implementation memo announcing that S-COMM would be reinstated and PEP 
would be rescinded. See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to Kevin 
McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Enforcement of the Immigration 
Laws to Serve the National Interest (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
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 332. In recent years, state election officials have used the Systematic Alien Verification for 
Entitlements (SAVE) database screening protocol to conduct voter purges. See Fatma Marouf, 
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“HAVA”333) has been used for voter purges and to restrict driver’s licenses 
as well as access to welfare benefits.334 
After 9/11, the federal government sought a sharp increase in personnel 
who could conduct vetting and implement screening protocols to increase the 
effectiveness of immigration gatekeeping.335  Thus, the federal government 
also increasingly invited state and local law enforcement to participate in the 
enforcement of federal immigration law under a “force multiplier” theory336 
of delegation of immigration gatekeeping.337  Under the expanded 
immigration gatekeeping mandates of DHS, state and local governments 
were granted access to DHS database screening systems and invited to screen 
arrestees through these systems.338  After 9/11, the federal government also 
experimented with the merging of database screening protocols to eliminate 
the separation between civil and criminal immigration database screening 
protocols.339 
Under immigration federalism and national security federalism, state laws 
have increasingly captured post-9/11 identity-management technologies 
introduced by DHS.  Consequently, comparisons between historic Jim Crow 
regimes and contemporary immigration enforcement regimes have 
intensified in recent years.  De jure discrimination has been alleged in state 
laws that mandate vetting protocols and the delegation of vetting and 
 
The Hunt for Noncitizen Voters, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 66, 66 (2012).  For more information 
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(last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
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screening responsibilities.  Similar to the segregationist gatekeeping duties 
that were delegated under historic Jim Crow regimes, restrictionist 
immigration gatekeeping protocols under Algorithmic Jim Crow have been 
criticized as promoting both de jure and de facto discrimination against 
citizens and lawful immigrants that may be perceived to be foreign.340  
Specifically, state laws have proposed that legal penalties and liabilities could 
be incurred by employers, police, landlords, doctors, school officials, and 
state benefits administrators who fail to conduct vetting and screening 
protocols. 
For instance, the Los Angeles Times invoked Jim Crow comparisons after 
passage of Alabama House Bill 56, a state law that attempted to control 
unwanted migration in part by delegating immigration screening to both 
private and public entities.341  Wade Henderson, president of the Leadership 
Conference on Civil and Human Rights, also drew a comparison.  On June 9, 
2011, the day Alabama House Bill 56 was signed into law, he remarked:  
“[E]ven Bull Connor himself would be impressed,” referring to the famed 
segregationist who served as Birmingham’s public safety commissioner 
tasked with enforcing the city’s Jim Crow laws during the 1950s.342 
Similarly, the governor of Arizona signed SB 1070 into law in 2013, 
referred to as the “racial profiling” law and the “show me your papers 
law.”343  Shortly thereafter, Reverend Lennox Yearwood of the Hip Hop 
Caucus, wearing a “Boycott Arizona” cap, declared during an interview that 
the Arizona immigration law is “our Jim Crow moment for the 21st 
century.”344  He further stated, “We can’t have anyone being checked based 
on the hue of their color . . . .  We need to put our lives on the line [in 
protest] . . . .  We need to stand up.”345  Members of Congress likened the 
Arizona law to Jim Crow and historic apartheid systems.346 
In future comprehensive immigration reform proposals and in the 
implementation of extreme vetting protocols—especially with the Supreme 
Court in both Whiting and Arizona apparently endorsing a potential merger 
between criminal and civil database screening protocols—it is possible that 
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other public and private actors could be delegated counterterrorism 
intelligence-gathering duties pursuant to immigration gatekeeping duties 
under the “force multiplier” approach.  In Whiting, the Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of delegating immigration database screening to private 
employers through the passage of the Legal Arizona Workers Act 
(LAWA).347  Under LAWA, employers in Arizona were not only document-
inspecting immigration gatekeepers.348  LAWA also transformed public and 
private employers into database screening gatekeepers through a legal 
requirement that they run all new hires through the E-Verify identity-
management system, which allows employers to screen employees through 
various federal agency databases.349 
Similarly, in Arizona, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
delegating immigration-database screening to state and local law 
enforcement after the passage of Arizona’s SB 1070.350  Similar to LAWA, 
state and local law enforcement were transformed into database screening 
gatekeepers through a legal requirement that they run all arrestees and those 
suspected of unlawful presence through S-COMM, an internet-based 
database screening system that checks biometric data (scanned fingerprints) 
against DHS and FBI databases. 
For example, in addition to Arizona’s establishment of an employer-
sanctioning regime in LAWA (holding private employers responsible), and a 
police-sanctioning regime in SB 1070 (holding state and local law 
enforcement responsible), the state proposed a landlord-sanctioning regime 
in SB 1611,351 enacted a state-worker-sanctioning regime in HB 2008,352 
proposed a hospital-worker-sanctioning regime in SB 1405,353 and proposed 
and enacted a public-school-worker- or teacher-sanctioning regime in SB 
1407354 and SB 1141.355 
Each of Arizona’s proposed sanctioning regimes requires a screening or 
vetting system because otherwise, the Arizona legislature has contended, it 
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could not verify who among its residents is an unauthorized immigrant and 
who is not.  The identity-management technology often relied upon by the 
state gatekeeping law involved an algorithm-based database screening 
protocol, often supplemented by a paper-based inspection, to log personally 
identifiable data into a preexisting vetting and database screening system 
operated by DHS.  Although not all of these measures passed, the 
gatekeeping and screening aspects of Arizona’s proposed comprehensive 
immigration reform strategy, as well as other state and local laws passed or 
considered in recent years, has resulted in an unprecedented expansion of 
document inspection and database-driven screening protocols.356 
Arizona’s aggressive stance on restrictive immigration gatekeeping is 
enabled by the introduction of big data vetting analytics and database 
screening potentialities, often conducted through internet-based screening of 
DHS and other federal agency databases.  It shows the multifold 
opportunities for electronic vetting in daily life.  And while it is a system to 
screen out immigrants, at the national level and in the national security 
context, newly emerging digital watchlisting and database screening 
programs such as the No Fly List make clear that database screening is easily 
adaptable to other kinds of vetting for various purposes.  Those screened or 
vetted will individually encounter a purportedly neutral and colorblind 
process but with the result that they fall into groups that can start to look 
much like the kinds of classifications that would normally offend the 
Constitution’s equal protection guarantees. 
Consequently, the extreme vetting protocols and the implementation of a 
Muslim registry should be understood within the context of delegated 
database screening protocols, such as those proposed and passed by Arizona.  
As can be seen in the discussion above, the efforts by the federal and state 
government to collect and screen data under the auspices of immigration-
control policy now extend to a wide range of contexts, including employment 
screening and day-to-day policing.  This appears to be consistent with data-
collection and screening policies under the Trump administration.  “Asked 
where [Muslims] would be registered, [Trump] said Muslims would be 
signed up at ‘different places . . . .  [I]t’s all about [data] management.’”357  
Candidate Trump specifically referred to the need to deploy DHS identity-
management technologies:  “Trump tied his reasoning for the database to the 
need to identify who is in the country legally.  ‘It would stop people from 
coming in illegally,’ Trump said.  ‘We have to stop people from coming into 
our country illegally.’”358 
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C.  Litigating Algorithmic Jim Crow 
The number of individuals and private entities affected by government 
identity-management programs is growing as rapidly as the programs 
themselves, and future attempts to seek judicially imposed limits on such 
programs appear inevitable.  The broader question, thus, is not whether the 
scientists in Nelson were denied a constitutional right to privacy but whether 
any limiting principle can be articulated to curtail the government’s attempt 
to engage in post-9/11, semiuniversal vetting and screening systems, such as 
the No Fly List, and biometric dataveillance credentialing, such as HSPD-12, 
in the name of furthering national security, crime control, and immigration 
policy. 
Under an “equal but separate” regime, identity-management systems that 
purport to collect and sort data of individuals equally, however, may impose 
disparate consequences through colorblind vetting protocols and “race-
neutral” database screening systems.  Yet, whether biometric-based 
identification systems can be presented as colorblind and “race-neutral” is in 
doubt.  Racial characteristics are among the data collected in biometric 
databases.  Soft biometric data, for instance, includes digital analysis or 
automated determination of age, height, weight, race or ethnicity, color of 
skin and color of hair, scars and birthmarks, and tattoos.359  Further, newly 
developed big data vetting tools fuse biometric data with biographic data and 
internet and social media profiling to algorithmically assess risk.  Data fusion 
techniques are not race neutral, as recent reports have exposed how data 
analytics can result in pinpointing racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic 
characteristics through big data analysis tools.360  As plaintiffs in the No Fly 
List litigation allege, those disparately impacted by mandatory vetting and 
screening protocols will largely fall within traditional classifications—race, 
color, national origin, ethnicity, and religion—depending on what may be 
determined to be suspect criteria.361 
Recent immigration-control policy and programs demonstrate the 
government’s interest in delegating immigration-vetting duties to private 
actors,362 such as employers, and nonfederal actors, such as state and local 
law enforcement363 or their privatized subdelegates,364 which can exacerbate 
issues of racial profiling and discrimination.  For instance, LAWA and 
Arizona’s SB 1070 are examples of immigration federalism and national 
security federalism.  Immigration federalism traditionally has denoted state 
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and local efforts to control or mitigate the impact of unwanted migration or 
to regulate the admission of noncitizens across state borders.365  In the past 
few years, several thousand state and local immigration-related laws have 
been considered in almost every state.366  This level of immigration 
federalism activity is unprecedented in U.S. history.367 
Also unprecedented, however, is the manner in which immigration 
federalism is intersecting with two other critical movements in U.S. history:  
(1) an increasing reliance on database-sorting technology and dataveillance 
in federal immigration policy to facilitate state-federal partnerships in the 
control of unwanted migration; and (2) a post-9/11 national security policy 
of national security federalism that encourages a state-federal partnership in 
the furtherance of intelligence-gathering and homeland security objectives 
under a “force multiplier” theory. 
In the DHS memos released by then-DHS Secretary John Kelly on 
February 21, 2017, which implemented the Executive Orders on immigration 
signed by President Trump on January 25, 2017, DHS stated that the 
executive branch would apply a “force multiplier” approach to the 
immigration-control and national security effort.368  Identity-management 
technologies that rely upon the internet and digital databases to verify identity 
have been developed to help execute these goals.  As a presidential candidate, 
Trump explained that immigration-control and counterterrorism efforts 
required “a lot of systems, beyond databases.”369 
Because these statutes are perceived as targeting primarily those born in 
foreign countries but residing here, the questions of government intrusion and 
disparate impact are obscured.  However, while the state and federal laws at 
issue may be immigration laws first, they are still identity-screening laws, 
and the entire population—citizens and noncitizens—is subject to their 
vetting and screening protocols.  Consequently, immigration federalism, 
when combined with national security federalism, is driving the exponential 
expansion of identity-management programs and biometric-database 
screening. 
Given the historical connection between mass data collection and mass 
discrimination,370 federal courts may require an inquiry into the 
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discriminatory animus in the design of the vetting protocols and the database 
screening systems.  That inquiry will likely start from an assessment of the 
disparate impact of identity-management technologies.  Relatedly, 
challengers and the courts must contemplate the disparate impact of the 
algorithms themselves, the screening inputs that produce the results, and the 
discriminatory result of other data-driven decision-making tools, rather than 
in the personal animus of the screener.  Judicial review should evolve to 
question analytical assumptions and to develop evaluative methods to 
interrogate the underlying algorithms informing the screening and vetting 
systems. 
Challengers and federal courts must also become more aware of other 
types of discrimination that can be facilitated by digitalized vetting and 
screening protocols.  Although “data driven discrimination” is not currently 
recognized, we can begin challenging the collection of data under privacy 
theories and attempt to limit the ways in which judgments can be made based 
on the analysis of such data.  Nelson, for example, challenged data-driven 
decisions that imposed arbitrary definitions of suitability on moral 
proclivities rather than decision-making founded on a secure rational 
basis.371 
Further, identity-management technologies and Algorithmic Jim Crow 
may force innovations in constitutional data-privacy theories.  These may 
include, for example, asserting a reasonable expectation of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of the search and seizure of data.  The 
original complaints filed to enjoin LAWA’s mandatory E-Verify database 
screening alleged a Fourth Amendment violation.372  Among other 
challenges, the Chamber of Commerce argued that E-Verify required an 
unconstitutional search and seizure of an employee’s personally identifiable 
information by Arizona employers.373  The Fourth Amendment challenge, 
however, was not the driving force behind the litigation, was withdrawn by 
stipulation before the district court,374 and was not before the Supreme Court 
in Whiting, which focused on the question of preemption.375  Although the 
United States only challenged section 2(B) of Arizona’s SB 1070 on 
preemption grounds, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) had 
originally raised other constitutional claims, including a Fourth Amendment 
claim, to the implementation of section 2(B), which required mandatory 
biometric-database screening of those suspected of unlawful presence.376  
 
Papers Show Census Role in WWII Camps, USA TODAY (Mar. 30, 2007), 
https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-03-30-census-role_n.htm 
[https://perma.cc/82GL-P5KR]; see also supra notes 132, 134 and accompanying text. 
 371. See supra notes 253–78 and accompanying text. 
 372. See Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1061 (D. Ariz. 
2008). 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id.  
 375. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 594 (2011). 
 376. Valle del Sol v. Whiting, No. CV 10-1061-PHX-SRB, 2012 WL 8021265, at *2 (D. 
Ariz. Sept. 5, 2012). 
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Once again, the Fourth Amendment claim was not before the Supreme Court 
in Arizona, which also focused on preemption.377 
It is important to note as well that, similar to Korematsu, the No Fly List 
challengers have relied on due process rather than equal protection.  As in 
Korematsu, the government has defended the No Fly List as a national 
security program that does not target classifications of individuals, but, 
rather, targets risk.  In his dissent in Korematsu, Justice Frank Murphy stated 
that “the order deprives all those within its scope of the equal protection of 
the laws as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.”378 
Of the relationship between due process and equal protection, William 
Eskridge has observed that “[t]he Due Process Clause announces a 
procedural norm.”379  To the extent that the Due Process Clause is recognized 
to carry a substantive element, Eskridge explains the courts demand “a fit 
between the reasonableness of the deprivation (whatever the process) and the 
‘law of the land.’  The Equal Protection Clause requires the state to justify 
any difference in procedural or substantive treatment of one person vis-à-vis 
another.”380  Consequently, the Equal Protection Clause may be less useful 
than other constitutional options that can force political change, such as the 
Due Process Clause and the First Amendment.381 
Eskridge suggests, however, that the Due Process Clause can secure 
important rights at the individual level.382  He notes that our conception of 
due process is more elastic and can track changing standards of social 
progress.383  Further, 
Perhaps the most fundamental value found in the Due Process Clause is the 
idea that the state is obligated to treat every person as a presumptively 
worthwhile human being who is entitled to respect and humane treatment.  
This principle is the key reason Buck v. Bell and [Korematsu] were wrongly 
decided.”384 
Eskridge signals that the time might be right to view equal protection and due 
process as “interchangeable and interdependent” in the vindication of 
individual rights.385 
There are benefits to prevailing under an equal protection claim,386 
namely, “the Equal Protection Clause alone offers a minority group a 
 
 377. See generally Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012). 
 378. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 234–35 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) 
(“In excommunicating them without benefit of hearings, this order also deprives them of all 
their constitutional rights to procedural due process.  Yet no reasonable relation to an 
‘immediate, imminent, and impending’ public danger is evident to support this racial 
restriction, which is one of the most sweeping and complete deprivations of constitutional 
rights in the history of this nation in the absence of martial law.”). 
 379. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 
47 UCLA L. REV. 1183, 1187 (2000). 
 380. Id. at 1187–88. 
 381. Id. at 1214. 
 382. Id. at 1183. 
 383. Id. at 1210. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. at 1216. 
 386. Id.  
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potential constitutional jackpot at the wholesale level, that is, in challenges to 
an array of interconnected discriminations in state benefits as well as 
burdens.”387  Eskridge posits, however, that due process can yield similar 
wholesale benefits to protection as the Equal Protection Clause; under the 
Constitution, there is no theoretical or historical limit to extending wholesale 
rights to classes of individuals under a due process theory.388  In fact, a 
“destabilizing due process” that offers multiple opportunities to challenge 
discrimination can result in an “evolutive equal protection.”389  Thus, the 
equal protection process may need to be pushed to evolve to realize new 
forms of discrimination once the Due Process Clause forces the federal courts 
to confront the unreasonableness of wholesale deprivations and the need to 
grant wholesale benefits to challengers alleging the infringement. 
In the context of Algorithmic Jim Crow, however, the interrelationship 
between due process and equal protection is more pragmatic.  Challenging 
algorithm-driven vetting and screening protocols under due process claims 
means demanding answers about the “black box” processes that may flag 
individuals as potential risks or threats.390  As the algorithms and data-
analytic processes become more transparent, equal protection violations can 
no longer be as easily disguised.  This destabilization or disruption of 
government deprivations made possible by due process challenges can give 
new evaluative impetus to the evolution of the types of protections offered 
under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Arguably, this process of destabilizing algorithmic due process is already 
occurring under due process and equal protection challenges, among others.  
The No Work List has been implicated in an equal protection challenge.391  
The No Vote List has been challenged392 under section 2 of the Voting Rights 
 
 387. Id. (“[T]he Court’s apparent classification-based approach offers a tremendous reward 
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be applied on the wholesale level.”). 
 389. Id. at 1186. 
 390. See PASQUALE, supra note 191, at 101–03; Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due 
Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1260 (2008); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 196, at 3–4; 
Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process:  Toward a Framework to Redress 
Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 122 (2014); Hu, supra note 160, at 1759; 
Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process, 40 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 
(2005). 
 391.  See Puente Ariz. v. Arpaio, 76 F. Supp. 3d 833, 842 (D. Ariz. 2015), rev’d in part, 
vacated in part, 821 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2016).  In Puente, the plaintiffs challenged the 
constitutionality of state statutes “that criminalize the act of identity theft done with the intent 
to obtain or continue employment.” Id.  The state statutes in question required employers to 
use E-Verify and included provisions to ensure employers’ participation in the E-Verify 
program:  the “Legal Arizona Workers Act” and “Employment of Unauthorized Aliens.” Id. 
at 844.  The district court preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of the statutes, finding that 
the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their equal protection 
claim. Id. at 854–56. 
 392.  See Arcia v. Fla. Sec’y. of State, 772 F.3d 1335, 1348 (11th Cir. 2014) (reversing and 
remanding the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law to the Secretary of State of 
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Act393 and the “90 Day Provision” of the National Voter Registration Act.394  
The No Citizenship List has been challenged under both procedural due 
process and equal protection claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments,395 as well as under the Fourth Amendment.396  In addition, the 
subsequent litigation of the No Citizenship List was found to implicate the 
Tenth Amendment under the anticommandeering doctrine.397  The No Fly 
List and Terrorist Watchlist have been challenged under multiple legal claims 
 
Florida and declaring that the SAVE database screening program for voter purges were in 
violation of the 90-day provision of the National Voter Registration Act). 
 393. Id.  The original complaint alleged that the SAVE database screening program aimed 
at removing noncitizens from voter registration rolls violated section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act, asserting protection for “citizens . . . having ‘less opportunity than other members of the 
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect the representatives of their 
choice.’” Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 18, Arcia v. Detzner, 908 F. Supp. 
2d 1276 (S.D. Fla. 2012), vacated, 2015 WL 11198230 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2015) (No. 12-
22282-CIV), 2012 WL 2308560 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012)). 
 394. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 393, at 2.  The original 
complaint also alleged that the SAVE database screening program aimed at removing 
noncitizens from voter registration rolls violated section 8(b)(1) of the National Voter 
Registration Act, also known as the “90 Day Provision,” with plaintiffs asserting that the 
statute “prohibits the systematic purging of eligible voters from the official voter list for the 
State of Florida, within 90 days before the date of a primary or general election for Federal 
office.” Id. 
 395.  See, e.g., Complaint at 1, Galarza v. Szalczyk, No. 10-cv-06815, 2012 WL 1080020 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012), 2010 WL 4822758.  In the original complaint, the plaintiff brought 
an “action under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the authority of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).” Id.  Under the Fifth 
Amendment, the plaintiff alleged, “Issuance of an immigration detainer against Plaintiff based 
on his Hispanic ethnicity violated his right to be free from discrimination on the basis of 
ethnicity under the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. ¶ 94.  Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the plaintiff alleged, “Treating Plaintiff as presumptively subject to 
detention and removal as an ‘alien’ on the basis of his Hispanic identity violated his rights 
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. ¶ 104.  The plaintiff also 
alleged due process claims under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.  Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the complaint alleges that the defendants 
violated Plaintiffs right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution [by]: a) [i]mprisoning Plaintiff 
pursuant to a detainer issued on less than probable cause [and]; b) [f]ailing to give 
Plaintiff notice of and an opportunity to be heard regarding the grounds for the 
detainer before imprisoning Plaintiff pursuant to it. 
Id. ¶ 114.  Under the Fifth Amendment, the complaint alleged that the defendants “violated 
the Fifth Amendment by acting in the following ways:  a) [v]iolating the terms of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1357, as interpreted by the courts, by issuing detainers on less than probable cause; b) 
[m]isrepresenting immigration detainers as orders for mandatory detention contrary to 8 
C.F.R. § 287.7(a).” Id. ¶ 100. 
 396.  Id. ¶ 90.  In the original complaint, the plaintiff also brought an action under the 
Fourth Amendment, alleging that “[t]he issuance of the detainer against Plaintiff occurred 
without probable cause to believe that he was an ‘alien’ subject to detention and removal.  That 
issuance constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth 
Amendment.” Id. 
 397. See Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 636 (3d Cir. 2014).  In Galarza, the Third 
Circuit concluded that immigration holds are not mandatory commands, but rather—per the 
Tenth Amendment—discretionary for state agencies. Id.  Therefore, the court reasoned, a 
previously dismissed § 1983 claim against the county that allegedly held the plaintiff was 
erroneously dismissed and remanded. Id. at 645. 
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and constitutional theories,398 including procedural due process and 
substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment.399 
Algorithmic Jim Crow may not be challenged successfully on equal 
protection grounds, but, rather, on other legal grounds, such as informational 
privacy grounds, the legal claim in Nelson.  Nelson is especially useful to the 
analysis here as it involves a challenge to both a mandatory biometric ID 
program and the vetting protocols associated with the program.400  Like the 
loyalty requirements imposed by the January 27, 2017, Order,401 the vetting 
protocols challenged in Nelson also involved screening criteria to determine 
trustworthiness, morality, and suitability—criteria subsequently criticized by 
the Court as subjective and objectionable.402 
Consequently, legal responses to Algorithmic Jim Crow may require 
preconceiving identity-management harms to encompass a broad range of 
legal theories.  As in the No Fly List litigation, the government will likely 
defend disparate-impact consequences as justified based upon risk 
assessments, terroristic classifications, data-screening results deemed 
suspect, and characteristics establishing unsuitability.403  These are 
classifications and characteristics not protected by equal protection 
jurisprudence.  To acknowledge the harms emerging from Algorithmic Jim 
Crow, equality law should be broadened to recognize data-driven 
discrimination and recognition of algorithm- and big data-derived disparate 
impact, rather than limiting protection to only animus-based, classification-
driven discrimination. 
CONCLUSION 
Algorithmic Jim Crow regimes are distinguished from historic Jim Crow 
regimes in several significant respects.  Algorithmic Jim Crow is 
cybersurveillance driven and dataveillance dependent, built around the 
transparency of biometric identity and other technologies of identity 
management, monitoring internet and social media activity and contact lists 
through telephony databases, database screening and digital watchlisting 
enforcement, and other emerging big data surveillance techniques.  In 
contrast, traditional Jim Crow is law driven, built around the transparency of 
racial identity; monitoring economic, educational, political, and social 
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activity; and utilizing traditional criminal enforcement and detention tools as 
well as small data surveillance techniques.  Algorithmic Jim Crow describes 
an “equal but separate” system of de jure and de facto discrimination rather 
than the “separate but equal” discrimination of historic Jim Crow. 
The goal of Algorithmic Jim Crow is not physical separation per se.  
Rather, all individuals subjected to an Algorithmic Jim Crow regime may be 
equally vetted through database screening and digital watchlisting systems.  
The separation, however, is achieved through data discrimination applied on 
the back end of screening and vetting protocols rather than overt social and 
economic discrimination and legal apartheid applied on the front end of 
segregationist regimes.  The “equal but separate” impact of Algorithmic Jim 
Crow will likely manifest itself in the big data assessment of risk factors that 
purport to predict terroristic and criminal threat rather than segregation 
systems of racial or ethnic classification. 
In other words, individuals will be at risk of disparate treatment on the 
basis of suspicious algorithmic results and anomalous data, or “foreignness” 
characteristics.  Thus, disparate treatment stemming from cybersurveillance 
and dataveillance may not be characterized as traditional discrimination:  
discrimination on the basis of a historically protected class, for instance, race, 
color, ethnicity, national origin, and sex.  This type of identity-management, 
technology-based discrimination may, therefore, fall outside current 
interpretations of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause and outside the reach of the protection of civil rights statutes. 
Algorithmic vetting and biometric identification, especially once deployed 
across an entire citizenry, will likely lead to discriminatory profiling and 
surveillance on the basis of suspicious digital data and internet and social 
media activity deemed “suspect,” as well as classification-based 
discrimination, such as the isolation of those emigrating from Muslim-
majority nations.  These systems are likely to result in both direct and 
collateral discrimination on the basis of citizenship status, national origin, 
and religion, in particular.  In addition, recent immigration-control policies 
and programs demonstrate the government’s willingness to delegate 
screening and vetting duties to private actors, such as employers and local 
law enforcement, which can exacerbate issues of racial profiling and 
discrimination.  This discrimination may face limited or lenient review by a 
federal judiciary that generally grants broad deference in matters of 
immigration and national security. 
Because Algorithmic Jim Crow may appear to offer equality in theory, it 
may not be challenged successfully on equal protection grounds under the 
current equal protection framework.  Thus, the jurisprudence must evolve to 
encompass new harms and recognize the disparate-impact harms of 
Algorithmic Jim Crow regimes.  At the same time, Algorithmic Jim Crow 
must be challenged under other legal theories, including search and seizure 
of data under the Fourth Amendment, procedural due process and 
informational privacy rights under substantive due process guarantees of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, First Amendment theories, and other 
statutory and constitutional theories.  Wholesale disruptions to Algorithmic 
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Jim Crow under a wide range of legal theories will likely force an evolution 
of equal protection jurisprudence. 
